



Carpathian Euroregion: Prospects and Challenges

Workshop # 1

**Role of the Carpathian Euroregion
in Strengthening Security and Stability
in Central and Eastern Europe**


Sanatorium "Karpaty" (Ukraine), November 23-25, 2000

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PREFACE

The Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Prešov (Slovakia) and the Strategic Studies Foundation, Uzhgorod (Ukraine) held the workshop on **Role of the Carpathian Euroregion in strengthening security and stability in Central Eastern Europe** on November 23-25, 2000, in Sanatorium “Karpaty” (Transcarpathian Region of Ukraine). This event was the first in the series of four workshops within the joint project on **Carpathian Euroregion: Prospects and Challenges**. The project is supported by the Freedom House’s programs Partnership for Reform in Ukraine and Regional Networking Project and the Carpathian Foundation.

The project aims to address prospects for future developments of the Carpathian Euroregion and examine its role in the following areas:

- Strengthening security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe
- Solving minority problems in the area
- Improving cross-border economic co-operation
- Overcoming possible negative effects of the implementation of the Schengen-type border on eastern borders of an enlarged European Union.

The main goals of the project are as follows:

- To elaborate policy recommendations for the Carpathian Euroregion and also for central and local state and self-government authorities of the five participating countries
- To create a network of think-tanks and academic community within the Carpathian Euroregion in the field of political and economic studies
- To provide expert background for public discussion on issues of security, welfare, minorities, and Schengen in the area of Carpathian Euroregion and member countries.

This publication presents the policy recommendations on role of the Carpathian Euroregion in strengthening security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe that are worked out on the basis of the workshop discussion, the full text of the keynote reports and also selected contributions made during the panel discussions.

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Role of the Carpathian Euroregion in strengthening security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Reviewing the original security agenda of the Carpathian Euroregion

The Carpathian Euroregion was established on 14th February 1993 with the aim to facilitate and co-ordinate multi-sectoral cross-border co-operation among the member regions of five post-communist countries: Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary and Romania. The Carpathian Euroregion operates through its institutions such as the Central Secretariat, National Branch Offices and Working Commissions. It was the first Euroregion created exclusively by regions of the former communist countries with no participation by any EU member state.

The territory of the Carpathian Euroregion represents a unique region of Europe, a region where the borders of five post-communist countries meet together. This border region has a very heterogeneous ethnic, cultural and religious makeup as well as difficult history of frequent changes of borders. The regions of south-eastern Poland, north-eastern Hungary, north-western Romania, western Ukraine and eastern Slovakia are the poorest areas in their home countries. They are all some distance from capitals with more developed economic and social infrastructure. Considering these facts and circumstances, there was an understandable rationale for establishing a network of common interests and a co-operative structure aimed at minimising and avoiding potential tensions and misunderstandings among the peoples living in this border area.

The territory of this region encompasses several important security factors such as the meeting point of borders of five post-communist countries, the difficult history of this area with frequently shifting borders and the heterogeneous ethnic and religious makeup of its population. These security factors combined with the general intent to prevent any potential tensions in the region were the original *security motives* for the creation of the Carpathian Euroregion.

The lack of planning and the stagnation of the Carpathian Euroregion's activities

It is hard to dispute the fact that the activities of the Carpathian Euroregion have been sluggish during the last few years. One of the reasons is that the authorities of the Carpathian Euroregion missed the initial security agenda of the project. They have been developing activities focused on tourism, cultural exchange and education, while neglecting the unique and original agenda of the region whose importance extends beyond regional confines. Today, two of the five participating member countries - Poland and Hungary - are NATO member states. Provided that Poland, Hungary and perhaps also Slovakia are going to join the EU in the foreseeable future, a Schengen type border of an enlarged EU will divide the Carpathian Euroregion into two parts. What will be the implications of this development for cross-border co-operation within the Carpathian Euroregion? What strategy has been developed by the authorities of the Carpathian Euroregion with the aim of facing up to this challenge that represents a potential existential threat in terms of survivability of cross-border co-operation in the area?

In 1998 during the ceremony commemorating the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Carpathian Euroregion many distinguished speakers and founders of the Carpathian Euroregion expressed their concern about the future attractiveness of cross-border cooperation. As they pointed out, at the beginning the expectations from member regions were too big. However, the Carpathian Euroregion could not raise sufficient resources for its programs in order to be able to meet such expectations. The main reasons for this are both the lack of planning and the neglect of the original security agenda. In other words, the practical agenda of the Carpathian Euroregion left out the issues with relevant policy importance for the region, but also for a wider European context.

The Carpathian Euroregion did not become a real partner for the regional and central governments of the five participating countries or for international organisations such as the European Union or NATO because it did not even touch the issues of some real relevance for them and for the Euroregion itself. Although one of the tasks stated before the Carpathian Euroregion institutions is to facilitate preparation of cross-regional development strategies in specific fields, no such strategies have been developed up to now.

What do we mean when we speak about the security agenda and the security policy of the Carpathian Euroregion? What security issues and to what extent could be tackled by Euroregions?

Defining Euroregion as a security actor

In terms of traditional approaches to security that emphasise military factors and the state as a key security actor, a Euroregion as an institutional framework for interregional cross-border co-operation is no security actor and can do nothing substantial with security matters. However, security debate and understanding of international security have been changing significantly over the last few decades. As a consequence, two approaches to security can now generally be tabled: the new one of the wideners and the old military and state-centred approach of the traditionalists.

According to Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde who developed a new theoretical framework for analysis of security, “security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from *nonpoliticized* (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decisions) through *politicized* (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations) to *securitized* (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure)...” The authors state further: “Discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such”.¹ In other words, the condition for successful securitization of any public issue depends on the readiness of the public to accept extraordinary measures taken by government directed at settling this issue. In this respect, a government is successful when it is able to de-securitize public issues by eliminating the threats perceived by the public.

The analysis of threat perception in five member countries of the Carpathian Euroregion shows that the ranking of threats perceived by the public is almost identically structured in all participating states. Economic threats in terms of social security - or *social insecurity* - are on top of the range of threat perception in post-communist countries. Issues like living standards, unemployment and crime are viewed as the most pressing social problems, the solution of which is considered to be the top social and economic priority. Moreover, with respect to these issues the public in these countries is ready to accept extraordinary measures taken by

¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, pp. 21-47.

authorities. Thanks to analyses of threat perceptions and to the wideners' approach to security we are able to set a security agenda, which could be at least in part tackled by an Euroregion. There is little doubt that an Euroregion could not be an equal security actor to the state and be placed on the same level of relevance. However, this approach allows us to define the issues that could be at least partly de-securitized by the activities of an Euroregion in partnership with the participating states. In this way, the security strategy of an Euroregion is a strategy aimed at de-securitizing public issues that are perceived as security threats by the public in the area covered by cross-border co-operation.

Provided that the Carpathian Euroregion wants to be a successful project, get more resources and improve its activities, it must become a real partner for central governments of participating states and for international organisations that help address the real problems in the area. The Carpathian Euroregion has to change its policy planning and broaden its agenda. The starting point for this change is to deal with its original security agenda.

Defining the security agenda and the programs of the Carpathian Euroregion

It is possible to specify at least six security issues in relation to which the Carpathian Euroregion could become a partner of participating governments and of international organisations and play the role of a functional actor that helps to de-securitize these issues. The issues are as follows:

- Cross-border crime
- Illegal migration from other countries (outside the five within the Carpathian Euroregion)
- Illegal economic migration
- Implementation of the Schengen treaty provisions
- Issues related the Roma minority
- Environmental security

Crime, together with living standards and unemployment, present the most pressing social problems in member countries and regions of the Carpathian Euroregion. ***Illegal economic migration*** is directly connected with unemployment

in post-communist states. *Illegal migration from other countries* is perceived as a threat to “we-identities” in terms of societal security and at the same time it is considered one of the top priorities for EU countries within the Schengen area. The same concerns *cross-border crime*. All these issues belong to the most urgent social issues in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine and Romania. They are an important subject of public and governmental concern. The Carpathian Euroregion could develop programs that would bring together people from the border police, the crossing points and the customs controls in the five countries within the area of cross-border co-operation. Such a program or a set of programs under the umbrella of the Carpathian Euroregion would create new opportunities for the regular exchange of know-how and knowledge and would set a framework for regular co-operation. It is a challenge to develop some common strategy within the Carpathian Euroregion on these issues. In their planning the authorities of the Carpathian Euroregion have to work in close co-operation with the Ministries of Interior and with central governmental agencies of the five participating states. Such initiatives addressing the most pressing public issues would certainly be greatly welcomed in all participating countries and member regions.

All the three issues mentioned above are important topics not only in terms of domestic security in the countries that participate in the Carpathian Euroregion. They are also directly connected to the top foreign policy priorities of participating countries. They concern the accession processes of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania to the European Union and the *implementation of the Schengen treaty provisions* on the eastern borders of these countries. The issue of external borders of an enlarged EU and the future borders of the Schengen area represents one of the top policy items on current EU agenda. Provided that the Carpathian Euroregion will initiate programs in this field, it stands a chance of becoming a partner for the EU in this very important and sensitive area. Furthermore, Schengen itself presents a security challenge for the future of cross-border co-operation within the Carpathian Euroregion. There is a need to develop a program together with governments of the participating countries and the EU aimed at eliminating possible negative effects on cross-border co-operation within the area of the Carpathian Euroregion. From the standpoint of both the EU and central governments of the five countries it would be very useful to draft such an initiative. Dealing with the issue of borders is of existential need in terms of the long-term survivability of the Carpathian Euroregion.

Finally, there is another issue, which belongs to both EU and member states policy priorities. This is the minority issue and principally the question of the *Roma minority*, which is a scattered minority living in all participating countries. The

Romas settled the area around the Carpathian mountains in the past and their concentration is quite significant in the Transcarpathian Region of Ukraine, north-western Romania, north-eastern Hungary and eastern Slovakia. The EU has recognised the fact that the Roma issue extends beyond borders of accession states and this is why it should be tackled in a broader European context. There is a need to develop a special program in co-operation with member states and the EU aimed at solving social and cultural problems of the Romas within the area of the Carpathian Euroregion. This is also especially important when we consider the fact that the territory of the Carpathian Euroregion is one of the oldest areas of the original settlements of the Romas in Europe.

There exists one more essential issue that should be addressed by security strategy of the Carpathian Euroregion. It concerns *environmental security* in the area. Disastrous floods affected the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine in 1998. Carpathian rivers such as the Tisa and the Laborec regularly suffer from industrial pollution. Although environmental threat perception in post-communist countries may be comparatively lower than in other areas of security issues, it is of important concern to the people living in the Carpathian Euroregion area near these rivers. Unfortunately, today there exist no public opinion polls about the awareness of environmental security among the people in the border area. Yet, environmental security of the Carpathian Euroregion must be on top of the agenda of cross-border co-operation. Here it is important to note the project titled “TISA”, initiated by Ministers of Defence of Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine and Romania. At the meeting held in Uzhgorod in May 2000 Ministers of Defence of member countries of the Carpathian Euroregion agreed to create a joint engineer battalion, which will be deployed in cases of environmental disasters. When created, this battalion will be the first multinational military unit in Central and Eastern Europe dealing with environmental security. There is a chance for the Carpathian Euroregion to develop its environmental security strategy in close co-operation with Ministries of Defence, other central and local agencies from participating countries and even in co-operation with EU and NATO institutions.

Developing planning and research for the Carpathian Euroregion

The Carpathian Euroregion as a project of cross-border co-operation will only be successful if it develops and implements programs dealing with actual and relevant public issues that form “security concerns” of the people living in the area, the governments of participating countries and pertinent international organisations. It

has the potential to become a real international actor that could help both to improve cross-border co-operation in the area and to establish good neighbourly relations among the five transition countries. However, the basic precondition for such developments is the building of strong partnerships with central and local governments and with international organisations. In order to form such partnerships, the Carpathian Euroregion must significantly improve its *policy planning* that is going to foster new ideas and solutions of real problems. If the authorities of the Carpathian Euroregion are seriously interested in such developments, their next step should be a creation of some research network within the area of the Euroregion. No *policy planning* is possible without *policy research*.

Research capacities of the five participating countries are concentrated mostly in their respective capitals. As a result, the Carpathian Euroregion and the local authorities in the border area lack sufficient research infrastructure in their decision-making. There is a need to mobilise all existing research capacities in the area and create a network of think tanks and academic communities that would work on specific policy questions. This policy research could become an important source of policy recommendations both for the Carpathian Euroregion and for local authorities. Development of policy research in the area should become one of the top priorities for the Carpathian Euroregion, for central and local governments of the member countries and for international organisations and agencies that are interested in successful prospects for cross-border co-operation in this region.

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Threats Perception in the Slovak Republic and Slovak Security Policy: Thinking about Role of the Carpathian Euroregion

Threats Perception in the Slovak Republic

The theoretical background and framework for the analysis of threats perception in the Slovak Republic over the last seven years is based on *Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998). According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, “security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from **nonpoliticized** (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through **politicized** (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations) to **securitized** (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure)”... Buzan, Waever and de Wilde stress that “discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such”. In other words, the condition for successful securitization of any public issue is readiness of the public to accept extraordinary measures taken by government with aim to settle it. In this respect a successful government is that which is able to de-securitize public issues in terms of the elimination of threats perceived by public. This analysis is focused on securitization of public issues that are presented as existential threats to the Slovak Republic or, at least, they are viewed as such by public opinion and also government (securitizing and functional actors). This overview attempts to specify *main public issues* in five sectors of analysis (military, political, economic, societal and environmental) which may be characterised as *securitized issues* and those, which are perceived by public opinion as threats to security.

Two phases of securitization (Tables 1-3)²; it is possible to outline two main phases of securitization in the Slovak Republic over the last decade as to the public

² See Tables and figures, p. 65

opinion. The first one – *phase of extreme securitization* - includes period of 1989 – 1993 (95?) when the critical social and political changes took place (fall of communism and disintegration of Czechoslovakia accompanied by building a new state) that challenged system of old standards of life, system of values, behaviour of societal actors, etc. Slovak population had no experiences with abilities of new political representation to rule the country and therefore prospects for future were not predictable and unknown. Whichever public issue could be securitized and perception both of internal and external *existential* threats was very high. This has been changed at about half of 1990s, when became clear that a new state power is able to rule the country, or at least, no general chaos in the country threatening basic human needs became a reality. This was a turning point and beginning of *the second phase of securitization* in Slovakia, which in comparison with the first one, may be characterised rather as *phase of de-securitization*. Typical features of the second phase are public acceptance of new state authority, abilities of the last to de-securitize majority of public issues, significant de-securitization of foreign policy issue in public opinion and dominant focus of the last on domestic issues.

Military securitization (Tables 4-10); military securitization follows line of two general phases of securitization in Slovakia from very high level in period of 1989-1993 to significantly lower one in the second half of 1990s. Perception of external threats by public opinion in Slovakia has been decreasing during the second half of 1990s. The main reason of this was an advance in establishing standard relations with neighbouring countries (especially with the Czech Republic and Hungary). Public focus has been shifted to domestic issues reducing foreign and security agenda to the “integration (with Western structures) issue”. Nevertheless, foreign and security agenda (also reduced mostly on NATO issue) is one of the most important topics in political debates and competition in Slovakia. Political scene in Slovakia is divided in two main parts as the NATO is concerned. Both parts the supporters and opponents of NATO membership try to *securitize* this issue in sense of getting support from the public. Arguing for or against NATO they *securitize* e.g. Russia (supporters) or NATO for itself (opponents). Probability that they will be successful in securitization of this issue is very low if take results of public polls from last years, provided that no dramatic international changes affecting Slovakia will take place.

Political securitization (Tables 11-16); the trauma experienced by Slovakia’s citizens from post-1989 developments is primarily expressed through their weaker sense of social security and well being. Any way, it creates favourable conditions for *growing political securitization* in the country. Populist and *non-standard parties* have still relatively strong political position in Slovakia and are able to mobilise

public discontent for the struggle over political and economic power. This is one of the most important reasons of political instability in the country. Slovakia has had seven governments over the last ten years. In other words, *political instability* and behaviour of political actors has to do with negative experience of Slovak population with a new political regime much more than with the state authority as such. Up to this time, political securitization in Slovakia remains very high. Political de-securitization in Slovakia depends directly on success of a new government elected in 1998 to solve economic and social problems, which could improve population's confidence in a new post-1989 regime and also weaken position of populist and non-standard political forces.

Economic securitization (Tables 17-19); it may be concluded that the economic securitization in the Slovak Republic is higher than political one. Moreover, economic insecurity perceived by the majority of population has negative impact on its attitude to political processes in the country being one of the main sources of political instability in general. Population's threat perception of the LIEO (Liberal international economic order) impacts on country's economic performance and welfare are much more less than economic threats perceived *in terms of social security*: living standard, unemployment and crime. These three issues are viewed like the most pressing social problems, solving of which is considered to be the highest social and economic priority. Moreover, public is ready to accept extraordinary measures used by state authorities in this respect. Securitizing potential of social insecurity remains high in both phases of securitization in Slovakia as described above. Among external factors with the most significant securitizing potential on economic sector in Slovakia, the number one is EU and EU-Slovakia' relation in both of political and economic contexts.

Societal securitization (Tables 20-29); what concerns societal securitization in terms of "we-identities", there are three main referent objects of concerns among Slovak population: political status of Hungarian minority, social status of Romas and illegal economic migration mostly from the post-soviet republics. All of them have strong securitizing potential. The fact that the political splitting occurs along ethnic lines, between the Slovak and Hungarian ethnic group, confirms that ethnic heterogeneity complicates the establishment and preservation of a liberal democracy in Slovakia. This creates a possibility for non-democratic political forces to mobilise the potential of ethnic differences and historic resentments for the struggle over political power. Unlike Hungarian question, which is viewed in Slovakia prevalingly as "ethnic question" in terms of "we-identities", Roma question has very strong social dimension and is connected more with the post-1989 developments than by ethnic or race considerations. It regards to deterioration of Romas' social status because of their

problems with adaptation on new social conditions and also to growing social distance of major population towards them. Illegal economic migration mostly from the post-soviet republics is perceived as threat because of competition on the country's labour market has been sharpened and the high rate of unemployment in Slovakia. All these *societal* problems represent serious challenges for Slovakia affecting process of transformation and also country's international status.

Environmental securitization; majority of Slovak population agrees with positive changes that could improve country's ecological situation, but public doesn't consider this as a pressing problem. Therefore it is not ready to be mobilised for solving environmental issues in sense of the acceptance of extraordinary measures. Up to the present time, irrespective of the real state of environment in Slovakia, public polls show that environmental securitization in Slovakia has very low potential.

If compare the level of securitization by sectors in Slovakia and use ranking from the highest level (5) to the lowest one (1), it is possible to rank the sectors as follows: Economic (social) securitization (5); Political securitization (4); Societal securitization (3); Military securitization (2); Environmental securitization (1).

Threat perception by public, which is similar in all transition countries, provides more arguments in favour of sc. widen approach to security in a modern security debate. Unlike traditionalists who stress an importance of state - military factors, wideners try to enlarge an understanding of the modern security agenda. This is very important starting point for our thinking about the security role of euroregions generally and Carpathian Euroregion especially. Naturally, euroregion is an international actor, which simply can not be placed at the same level as state in terms of its relevancy. Any way, wideners' approach to security allows us to set a security agenda, which can be tackled by euroregion. In other words, I think, our task today is to define security issues which would be at least partly de-securitized by Carpathian Euroregion' programs and activities. In this way we could come to an understanding what may or might be, let to say, a security policy or better to say a security strategy of the Carpathian Euroregion. I will try to summarise such issues and areas at the final point of my presentation.

Security of the Slovak Republic: External Challenges and Policy

As showed above, Slovak public does not perceive a foreign and security policy as an existential problem being focused on domestic issues. But, naturally, it is not the same with the Slovak government, political elite and expert community that

reflect much more carefully an international environment of the Slovak Republic. Coming to let to say a hard security agenda I am going to speak about the effects of NATO' first wave enlargement, NATO military operation against Yugoslavia, and also Washington summit with the new NATO strategic concept for 21th Century, which together present qualitatively new security challenges for Europe generally and each European country particularly.

First round of NATO enlargement and its effects on Slovakia; accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO has created a new security situation in Europe as a whole. Nevertheless, it would be very hard to find a single country, which would be affected so directly by this like the Slovak Republic. All three new NATO members are Slovakia's immediate neighbours. Thus, if take the total length of Slovakia's frontiers – 1611.5 km, those with NATO members, after March 12, 1999, present 86.9 per cent of the total country's frontiers (Hungary – 630.9 km, Poland – 508.2, Czech Republic – 261.3, total with NATO countries – 1400.4 km), while 13.1 per cent are those with neutral Austria (115.3 km) and Ukraine (95.8 km). Slovakia as a part of Czechoslovakia shared with Poland and Hungary a common destiny, international challenges, problems, very similar cultural, economic and social developments after WWII and also long centuries before. First round of NATO enlargement without Slovakia creates a qualitatively new geopolitical situation within historically one and the same regional unit of Europe. At least, it is viewed and perceived so by majority of politicians, experts and those who are publicly active in Slovakia. Defining a new reality in the region, Slovak optimists use the formula “3+1” and hope that it will take a short time when Slovakia will join NATO. Slovak pessimists use the formula “3-1” and think that contemporary situation will be a true for a very long time if not forever. Any way, the fact that Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO on March 12, 1999, countries which share with Slovakia near 90 per cent of Slovakia's frontiers, means that they exist now in a qualitatively different international security regime than Slovakia does. In other words, it means in certain aspects that the level of Slovakia's international security is less than security of its neighbours. This reality changes Slovakia's regional and international position, it influences country's foreign and security policy, in certain aspects also domestic one, and also affects defence planning as well. First of all, in spite of fact that Slovakia is out of NATO, it becomes much more dependent on NATO as it was whenever before.

NATO New Strategic Concept and the Balkan crisis; the another security challenge for Europe and also for Slovakia is Kosovo or, better to say, Balkan crisis and following NATO military operation against Yugoslavia. NATO operation started on March 24, 1999, one month before Washington summit, but it was clear that it

has defined a new NATO strategic concept practically, even before summit in Washington, where this concept has been accepted formally. Of course, today, in connection with the Balkan crisis, there are more questions than given answers. The first main packet of such questions relates to a NATO new role in Europe, internal developments within the Alliance and also the future process of NATO enlargement. Everything this is vital to Slovakia's security interests, and everything this today depends primarily on NATO success in Yugoslavia. NATO, which would not be able to implement its strategic concept in practice in Yugoslavia, very probably, will lose its strategic initiative and this would be the worst possible scenario for both NATO and Europe as a whole, and especially for security of the small CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries), including Slovakia. Very important in this respect is a process of redefinition of transatlantic partnership between the U.S. and the Western European allies started at the qualitatively new level after the Kosovo crisis. What will be a shape of European Security and Defence Policy of the EU, for what it will be responsible, what will be its effectiveness and what it will mean for the future of NATO? All this questions are open.

A Russian factor in the CEE; another packet of such questions in connection with Balkan crisis relates to Russian security policies. From point of security interests of Slovakia, moreover, Slovakia which is out of NATO after the first wave of enlargement, there is very important question concerning future relations between the NATO and Russia, that are in fact questions about a new security order in Europe - with or without Russia. In spite of signing Founding Act in 1997, Russia continued to make an alternative security policy in Central Europe, but she accepted agreed rules of diplomatic competition. In other words, Russia accepted rules of a predictable behaviour, which is very important from point of view of the CEEC' security interests, first of all those that are out of NATO. Now, after Kosovo, the question sounds: Is it possible to come back to time of the signing of the Founding Act and what will be a "Russian price" for that? Will NATO continue in enlarging process not taking into account a Russian view? If yes, this would mean that NATO would take over responsibility for building a new security order in Europe without and very probably against Russia. Any way, it would be much more expensive alternative for European security. If not, there is a risk that NATO will lose its strategic initiative, which as mentioned above, in long-term perspective, may return Europe to a new era of a "power concert" and bring Russia again into Europe as it was up to the recent times. This is, of course, very black picture of future development for small CEEC, especially those that are out of the Western structures. Russian factor in CEE has to do not only with security issues in terms of military defence, but it has to do also with security issues in a wider understanding, first of all, it concerns perspectives of CEEC' postcommunist transformation.

Between the West and the East; Russia, which resulted from the development in the 1990s, represents an alternative model of political and economic transformation in postcommunist world and for CEE countries, which have been developing new and stable democratic institutions. The Russian economic reform was largely reduced to privatisation, and was not accompanied with political reforms and development of democratic institutions. On the contrary, it was the goal of a quickly formed post-privatization oligarchy, trying to fix the existing status quo in the society at all costs, which pressed on introduction of an autocratic regime (the sc. “Electoral democracy” model). Thanks to its rich raw-material basis, Russia is able to survive economically even if it rejects to observe the Western economic efficiency criteria. If this model is put into practice, which is very probable, Russia will be modernised on the basis of the traditional industrial development model. The post-Soviet space as a system of economic, political, social, and security relations has survived. There is a real threat that this backward economic and political space will affect the former socialist countries and the CEE by its gravitational forces. The most serious threat to the CEE countries “from the East” does not consist in direct military aggression; rather, it bears on destabilisation of political and economic institutions according to the “Eastern model”. This model of transformation may become under certain critical development conditions attractive to the politically and economically inertial post-communist structures and autocratic political forces in the CEE countries. In this respect crucial is a question about the future of Ukraine and its ability to emancipate itself from Russian-way postsoviet transformation. If Russia goes on to represent an internal political and foreign alternative, the development of close relations with Russia will constitute risks for the process of transformation in the CEE countries based on the Western model. If Russia ceases to represent a transformation alternative, this being a less probable scenario, more convenient conditions for the development of its relations with the majority of the CEE countries would be established.

Both, the worst and the best scenarios for CEEC and for Slovakia; future developments will be substantially affected by the processes, which are under way in the Western integration structures, in the NATO and the EU. In case of erosion of these structures, Europe may witness a resumed classical concert of the world-powers, characteristic of the 19th and the early 20th centuries, in which Russia had always “played its role”. This development would in fact put an end to any prospects of gradual changes in Russia in terms of standardisation of internal political and economic conditions (i.e., its gradual “Europeisation”). In addition, this would considerably hamper, or even inhibit, successful completion of the reform process in the post-communist countries of the CEE. Some of these countries, especially those with autocratic tendencies, would fall within the zone of “Russian influence”.

This would give rise to a new wave of rivalry among the CEE nations, and jeopardise the European security. The only positive scenario is to maintain the present quality and pace of integration processes within the NATO, and primarily, to maintain its strategic initiative with regard to the post-communist Europe. Any future development in this direction is preconditioned by strengthening and intensifying the role both of NATO and EU in CEE as the best possible guarantee of successful reforms in the CEE countries and, possibly, in the future, in Russia. It is the only scenario that establishes optimum conditions for further development of standard, equal, and mutually advantageous relations between Russia and the CEE countries. Everything this concerns Slovakia's interests and everything this is now challenged by Balkan crisis as well as depends on NATO effectiveness to settle it.

Washington summit, Balkan crisis and security policy of the Slovak government; according to official statements after Washington summit given by the Slovak top representatives, it is possible to summarise an official evaluation of the summit results which are important for Slovakia in three main points as follows:

- Washington summit put Slovakia back on the road warding to NATO membership and this should be considered like a success of Slovak diplomacy if compare Washington 1999 with Madrid 1997 summit, where Slovakia has been simply ignored like not-existing country. This is a confirmation of the democratic changes, which took place in Slovakia after September 1998 elections and the first concrete step in implementation of a government program in field of foreign, and security policies.
- Washington summit demonstrated a full unity, readiness and decisiveness of NATO members to fulfil its mission in former Yugoslavia, which means that NATO importance in protecting stability and security in Trans-Atlantic area is growing. Slovakia will support this process and there are no other security alternatives for Slovakia, alternatives out of or without NATO.
- Slovakia became one of the seven equal candidates for NATO membership. NATO accepted the Membership Action Plan, which stated concrete criteria for each candidate country. Slovakia is ready to fulfil them with the aim to receive a membership invitation at the next NATO summit (no later than Spring 2002). Slovakia will be a driving force of the second wave of NATO enlargement, or it is ready to become a NATO member individually. The election period of current coalition will be expired in Autumn 2002, when new parliamentary elections are to be held. Therefore, next NATO summit present a milestone for Dzurinda's cabinet as invitation received would be very important for Slovakia and Slovak democratic forces before the next Slovak parliamentary elections.

Yugoslavia has overshadowed the issue of NATO future enlargement in Washington, what in fact did not correspond with interests of the Slovak diplomacy. However, just during the Washington summit the first negotiations were held between the U.N. Secretary General and Slovak Minister of FA Eduard Kukan, which resulted in Kukan's appointment as a special envoy of the UN Secretary General for Kosovo. This is considered in Slovakia as another chance to increase country's role in international affairs, and fact proving that Slovakia has a confidence of international community. Kukan's appointment as U.N. special envoy for Kosovo is also important for NATO, as Slovakia unlike neutral countries such as Austria, Swiss (the second special U.N. envoy Carl Bildt comes from neutral Sweden) has opened its air space and ground communications for the NATO transports warding to the Balkans.

Yugoslavia crisis has showed military-strategic importance of Slovakia for NATO from point of the logistic of military operations in Balkans, but also in the Mediterranean. A belt of neutral states - Swiss, Austria, if-Slovakia and Ukraine separates main NATO military bases located in Northern Europe (Great Britain and Germany) from regions of Southern Europe with considerable conflict potential, which may present potential threat for security of the whole Euro-Atlantic area, and according to the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, there may appear a need in potential NATO military missions. Without Slovakia, Hungary as a NATO country is geographically isolated from the main NATO military bases located in Germany and Great Britain. In this context, the decision of the Slovak government to open country's air and ground communications for the NATO transports, a decision taken by Slovakia as only country from the s.c. "neutral belt" mentioned above, has created a Central European corridor for NATO transports to Balkans and significantly improved NATO logistic capabilities. At least, it made NATO military operation against Yugoslavia less expensive. Dzurinda's cabinet proved in practise that Slovakia is really decided to co-operate very closely with NATO as well as to behave like the NATO member de facto.

At the first glance, it might to seem that transborder co-operation has to do nothing with let to say a hard security agenda. Security traditionalists would say that Carpathian Euroregion is no state actor and therefore it has neither capacities nor competencies to do something in this respect. On one hand, it is true. But, my point is that the Carpathian Euroregion provided that it wants to be a successful project of transborder co-operation and especially in this part of Europe simply can not avoid dealing with some issues and problems, which are connected with a contemporary security agenda in understanding of the wideners.

The Carpathian Euroregion and Security in Central Eastern Europe

Security considerations and factors as original motives for the creation of the Carpathian Euroregion; Carpathian Euroregion was established on February 14, 1993 with aim to facilitate and co-ordinate multi-sectoral transfrontier co-operation among the member regions of five postcommunist countries: Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary and Romania. Carpathian Euroregion operates through its institutions such as the central Secretariat, National branch offices and Working commissions. It is the first euroregion at all created exclusively by regions of the former communist countries with no participation of any EU member state. Moreover, this is a unique region in Europe, where the borders of five postcommunist countries come together. This border region has a very heterogeneous ethnic, cultural and religious structure. Regions of south-eastern Poland, north-eastern Hungary, north-western Romania, western Ukraine and eastern Slovakia are the poorest ones in their home countries. They are distant from capitals with more developed economic and social infrastructure. Taking into account these facts and circumstances, there was understandable reason why to establish a network of common interests and co-operation with the aim to minimise and avoid potential tensions and misunderstandings between people living in this border area. The idea was simply genial and its implementation was very good timed. I would like to stress here that security factors such as point of meeting of five postcommunist countries borders, very difficult history of this region with often changes of borders, heterogeneous ethnic and religious structure of population etc. were original motives for creation of the Carpathian Euroregion.

Stagnation of the Carpathian Euroregion's activities and the lack of planning; I think, it is very hard to question the fact that last-two three years the CE (Carpathian Euroregion) activities are sluggish. One of the reasons is I think that the CE authorities simply missed the initial security agenda of the project. They were developing the CE activities according to the models of West European euroregions focusing on education, tourism, cultural exchange etc. neglecting just unique and original let to say "security agenda" of the region. At the ceremony of the Fifth Anniversary of the CE in 1998, many distinguish speakers and founders of the CE expressed their concern about the future of the CE in terms of its attractiveness for member regions. As they pointed it out, there were too big expectations from member regions at the beginning, but CE could not raise sufficient resources for its programs able to meet those expectations. I think one of the reasons is the lack of planning as well as neglecting the original security agenda. Simply, the CE did not become a real partner for central governments of the five participating countries and international organisations such as the EU and NATO because it did not even touch

issues of a real importance for them. However, one of the tasks stated before the CE institutions is to facilitate preparation of trans-regional development strategies in the specified fields. I was eager to find something like that for whatever, but with no result. I think, provided that CE wants to be a successful project, became a real partner for central governments, to get more resources and improve its activities, it simply must to change its planning and respectively to enlarge the agenda. First of all, it has to go back and start to deal with its original security agenda.

Potential “security programs” of the CE viewed from Slovakia; now I would like to present a list of issues and areas that I think could be addressed by the CE programs. I am going to speak about the issues perceived like security threats by Slovak public and which are among the top priorities of the Slovak government’s policies following the analysis of the threat perception in Slovakia as introduced above. It is possible to specify three issues at least in solving of which the CE could be a partner for the Slovak government in terms of playing a role of functional actor helping to de-secure them. These issues are as follows:

- Transborder crime
- Illegal migration from third countries
- Illegal economic migration

Crime, together with the living standard and unemployment, presents the most pressing social problems in Slovakia in terms of the social-economic security or better to say the social insecurity. The illegal economic migration is directly connected with unemployment or is perceived in this way by the Slovak public. Illegal migration is perceived as threat to “we-identities” in our countries in terms of societal security as defined by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde. I am sure that all these issues belong to the top urgent public issues also in Poland, Hungary, Ukraine and Romania being a subject to the public as well as governments’ concerns. One could object that all these issues are in the agenda of the central powers and that the CE has nothing common with this. But, why not to develop programs within the CE activities which will bring together people serving at the border police, crossing points, customs control etc. in five countries within CE area? A program or programs ***roofed by the CE*** that will create new opportunities for them to exchange know-how, knowledge, to set a framework for regular co-operation, etc.? Why not to develop a common strategy of the CE on these issues aimed to help central and local governments to deal with them? Of course, in the close co-operation with the Ministries of Interiors and the central government agencies of the five participating countries. I am sure such initiative addressing the top urgent public issues would be highly appreciated in all the CE member countries.

Moreover, all three mentioned issues are important topics not only in terms of the domestic security in our countries. They are directly connected with the top foreign policy priority of at least the four CE participating countries. I mean accession process of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania to the European Union and the implementation of the *Schengen* treaty provisions on their eastern borders. Issue about the external borders of an enlarged EU and future borders of the Schengen area is one of the top policy issues of the current EU' agenda with direct security connotations. Provided that the CE will initiate programs in this field I am sure it has chance to become a partner for the EU in this very important and sensitive field.

Furthermore, I think, Schengen for itself presents a security challenge for the future of the CE project. Provided that Poland, Hungary and perhaps Slovakia will join EU in the first wave of expected enlargement, Schengen will divide the CE on two parts. What will be implications for the CE transborder co-operation? What is the CE strategy in this respect? Why not to try together with the EU and governments of participating countries to discuss possible negative effects on transborder co-operation within the CE area with aim to prevent or minimise them? I think, it would be very useful and actual initiative from point both of the EU and central governments of the CE countries. And finally, I think, it is simply an existential need in terms of survivability of the CE as such.

And finally, there is another issue, which belongs to the EU and the CE member states policy priorities. I mean, minority issues and first of all the Roma or Gypsy minority, which is sc. homeless minority living in all CE countries. Gypsies settled the Carpathian Mountains capes in the past and their concentration is quite significant in the Transcarpathian Region of Ukraine, north-western Romania, north-eastern Hungary and eastern Slovakia. The EU has recognised a reality that the Roma issue overlaps the borders of accession states and this is why it should be tackled in a broader European context. Why not to develop a special program in co-operation with the CE member states and the EU aiming to solve social and cultural problems of Romas within the CE area? Especially if take into account a fact that just the CE area is one of the oldest areas of the Roma original settlement in Europe at all.

I would like to come to the end of my very short overview of potential issues and areas, which may be addressed by CE's, let to say "security strategies" with the most visible one. I mean *environmental security* in the CE area. The disaster floods affected the Transcarpathian Region of Ukraine two years ago. Carpathian rivers such as the Tisa and the Laborec are almost regularly afflicted by the escape of industrial stuffs. All we remember the last event when chemical agents affected the

Tisa River destroying a natural biological environment in the river, contaminating resources of fresh waters in Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia. In spite of the fact that threat perception by Slovak public in sector of environmental security is comparatively lower to the other security sectors, it is not true for the people living in Eastern Slovakia near to the Carpathian rivers. Unfortunately, there are no public polls mapping awareness of people in this respect in Eastern Slovakia. Any way, I think, environmental security of the CE area must be on the top of the CE's agenda. But, it is not. Here I would like to note the project titled the "TISA" initiated by Ministers of Defence of Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine and Romania. At the meeting held in May 2000 in Uzhgorod Ministers of Defence of the CE member countries agreed to create a joint engineer battalion, which will be deployed in cases of environmental disasters. I would like to stress that once created it would be the first multinational military unit in the CEE dealing with environmental security. Question sounds: why not to develop environmental security strategy of the CE in close co-operation with Ministries of Defence, other central and local agencies from participating countries and even with the EU and NATO?

Concluding remark; the Carpathian Euroregion as a project of transborder co-operation will be successful provided that it will develop and implement programs dealing with actual and relevant public issues which are among let to say "security concerns" of people living in the area and governments of participating countries. It might become a real international actor improving transborder co-operation in the area and good neighbourly relations between five transition countries, when it could build a good partnership with central and local governments and international organisations. It could become such partner provided that it will significantly improve its planning policy, which will enable it to come with new ideas and solutions of real problems. If the CE authorities are seriously interested in such developments, next step must be creation of research network within CE area serving to them. No policy planning is possible without policy research. I hope our project might be a good starting point in this right direction.

Ferenc Kontra

Hungarian-Ukrainian cooperation

Ukraine is Hungary's biggest neighbour. Its importance to Hungary is given by the fact that the 136 km long common border is Hungary's only Eastern gate. Oil and gas pipelines cross this border. It is the meeting point of wider Eastern and narrower Western railways where all the rail waggons have to be stopped and reloaded. Zahony is going to be the biggest railway junction on the future outer border of the enlarged European Union. Soon the 5th Trans European Corridor connecting Italy-Slovenia-Hungary and Ukraine will also cross this border.

Less than a decade ago Hungary supported the birth of Ukraine as a sovereign country. We have recognised the sovereignty of Ukraine on 3 December 1991 just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hungary was the first to open an embassy in Kiev. Ukraine has signed her first bilateral treaty with Hungary on 6 December 1991. The treaty was the first international document recognising Ukraine's international borders. In that treaty the parties confirmed that they had no territorial claims on each other. Months before the basic treaty the two countries have signed a Declaration on the rights of national minorities living in their countries. This was an outstanding document at that time since it served as a model document between neighbouring countries on the issue of guaranteeing the rights of national minorities.

Ukraine has celebrated its 9th anniversary of Independence in August this year. During the last decade we were successful in creating and signing the necessary treaties covering all spheres of life. Presidents and Prime Ministers of our countries meet regularly. These high level meetings are supposed to give new impetus to our relations, but they very often serve as a new starting point in our relations. As months pass by the readiness to implement the decisions reached by the heads of state or government is fading. It seems that we are not strong in implementation. We sincerely hope that the meeting of our Prime Ministers which is supposed to take place tomorrow in Budapest will be a good exception.

Regardless of the difficulties of cooperation we are doomed to cooperate. By joining NATO and sooner or later – we hope sooner – the European Union Hungary is not leaving the geographic region. We shall be neighbours with Ukraine regardless of the alliances and international organisations we join. This idea led us to the recognition of the fact that we have to improve our practical cooperation in all fields of life.

Being in Uzhgorod I can not neglect the issue of transborder cooperation between Hungary and Ukraine. I would like to shed some light on our motives which led us when we decided at the beginning of this year to intensify our transborder cooperation as well as the work already done and our future plans.

Szabolcs-Szatmat-Bereg County of Hungary and Subcarpathian County of Ukraine are closely co-operating with each other. The fall of the Soviet Union and the demolition of the Iron Curtain had positive impact on our bilateral relations. The areas along our common border have very similar problems: they are among the least developed areas both in Hungary and in Ukraine, where unemployment is high, infrastructure is relatively poor and the level of investment is low. Both areas are far from the capital and with the distance the attention of the central authorities is decreasing. Regional leaders and the local people have long ago realised that the development of their regions can happen only if they act together. It would be senseless to develop modern infrastructure, roads, or highway only on one side of the border if they lead to nowhere on the other side. Similar would happen if border stations were developed by Hungary at one location while our neighbour developed its border crossing points at another location. Coordinating of our development plans is a must.

During the official visit of Mr. Viktor Orbán Prime Minister of Hungary to Ukraine in February this year an agreement was reached on the highest level to focus our attention to the development of the common border area. We had to recognise that Hungary was too weak to stabilise the Ukrainian economy or to invest hundreds of millions needed in Ukraine. However it is our common interest to cooperate better in the area where cooperation has no alternative. The Prime Ministers have agreed to nominate their personal representatives, whose task is to work out the development concept of the Hungarian-Ukrainian border area. From Hungarian side the personal representative of the Prime Minister is Mr. Ferenc Kovács Director General and Chairman of the Regional Development Holding Ltd. Living and working in the border area he has long years of experience in working with Ukrainian partners.

The first task of the personal representative of the Hungarian Prime Minister is to make a snapshot of the situation of the border area. By contacting different Ministries, central and local authorities as well as multinational and Hungarian companies, entrepreneurs he has to give among others an answer to the following questions:

What kind of cooperation is going on at present in the area of our common border?

What are the problems of this cooperation?

What advantages can the area suggest to potential investors?

What should be done to make the area along the two sides of the border to be attractive for foreign investors?

Are there any laws or regulations that should be changed in order to give better conditions for cooperation?

As you can see from the above list of questions the border area should be developed together with our Ukrainian partners. It creates some problem that the nomination of the counterpart of Mr. Ferenc Kovács is expected since February always “in two weeks time”. Nevertheless whenever this nomination takes place the two representatives should meet immediately in order to coordinate their work. They have to work in the same direction and look for answers on the same questions. Otherwise their task will be very difficult to fulfil.

The final task of the special representatives is to work out the joint development concept of the border area which is to be presented to both governments for approval. On the basis of this document our countries are supposed to work out joint projects which could be presented to the European Union and international financial institutions for consideration.

I am very pleased to inform you about the first results of this transborder cooperation. The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Mr. János Martonyi has called the attention of Mr. Javier Solana Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and Mr. Christopher Patten, Member of the Commission of the European Union responsible for external affairs on the importance of Hungarian-Ukrainian cooperation. The Foreign Minister emphasised how highly the Hungarian side assessed the commitment of the Ukrainian leadership to cooperation with the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The letter also mentioned that it was a common European interest to make sure that Ukraine had stable, democratic, and predictable conditions in the fields of foreign policy, domestic policy and the economy. Today the maintenance of the independent, European-oriented line of Ukraine is severely hampered by the poor economic performance of the country, delays in the field of reforms necessary for economic restructuring, and the substantial dependence on energy imports. In this situation, it is a general European interest to ensure the economic stability of Ukraine, to bolster the fundamental institutions of a democratic law-governed society, and to support the implanting of the European system of values. Hungary considers it to be an important task to assist

Ukraine – also by strengthening our bilateral cooperation – to make sure that the above mutual interest is fully realised.

Recognising the strategic importance of Ukraine and of Hungarian-Ukrainian cooperation for Hungary, the Hungarian Government has decided to render more active its policy towards Ukraine, as part of the European integration process. In the course of high-level contacts, we continuously lend support to the constructive foreign policy moves – those consistent with European values – of the Ukrainian leadership. It is our conviction that deepening the cooperation with Ukraine, both in form and in content, the successful completion of the economic and social transformation of the country, and strengthening Ukraine's foreign policy commitment to the European system of values are a common European interest. Hungary does all it can to distribute the European system of values it shares to all its neighbours, including Ukraine.

We are very pleased that the European Union reacted positively to the joint Hungarian-Ukrainian idea of strengthening our transborder cooperation. In his answer to the Hungarian Foreign Minister Mr. Christopher Patten confirmed the aim of the EU to anchor Ukraine in the European family of nations sharing common values. At the same time he called our attention to the shaky implementation of Ukraine's commitments of the tasks outlined in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The member of the European Commission shared our view that the government of Mr. Yushchenko has signalled its commitment to implementation of the PCA as part of a pro-European, reformist strategy. The commissioner confirmed that the EU would positively view the possibility of co-ordinating Phare and Tacis funds for use in joint Hungarian-Ukrainian projects.

Hungary attaches great importance to its future membership in the European Union. During the pre-accession period we have to ensure legal harmonisation. It means also that Hungary will be obliged to join the Schengen Treaty and implement its provisions at the outer borders of the EU. As part of this process Hungary has introduced or in the process of introducing partial obligatory visa regime with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, regarding the special relations with Ukraine and also because of the close to 170 thousand Hungarians living in this country, Ukraine will be the last in the row. Regardless of the fact that introducing visa regime is not on the agenda at the moment, we have to start preparation to the situation when the Hungarian-Ukrainian border will be the outer border of the EU. It is necessary to have a border with strong control, capable of stopping illegal trade of narcotics as well as illegal migration. As international practice shows, obligatory visa system by itself is not a serious obstacle in the

relationship of two countries. We do not want to create a new Iron Curtain. Our intention is to keep the border open for tourists, businessmen and all those who cross the border with good intentions.

As you can see from the above mentioned Hungary attaches great importance to improving its cooperation with Ukraine. By calling international attention to the common border area we would like to attract investors and create new working places in the region. If we succeed in this goal we can definitely create more favourable conditions in the economic and social life of the area. New working places mean regular wages in an area where great portion of the population is unemployed. However, regardless of the efforts we make, foreign investors will not come to the area if we can not change the present situation. Today it is still a challenge to cross the Hungarian-Ukrainian border. Sometimes it takes hours and for truck drivers even days to cross the border. There are also problems with corruption, unhealthy business climate and poverty. Ukraine was ranked the third most corrupt country out of 90 surveyed by non-governmental organisation Transparency International on 13 September. Out of 60 countries surveyed by the Economist Intelligence Unit on 11 May Ukraine was judged to have the fifth worst business climate. According to the index on 50 variables to determine if citizens live in poverty or prosperity Ukraine ranked 133 out of 155 countries surveyed in the seventh annual Index of Economic Freedom survey, published on 1 November by The Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation. These indicators turn away rather than attract foreign investors. In order to create an investment-friendly environment Ukraine has to increase stability and transparency of legislation, promote the rule of law, pass a new tax code, crack down on corruption etc. These steps will bring financing, know-how, and create jobs for Ukrainian citizens. To become part of the European economic mainstream and of the wider world economy, Ukraine must pursue further, far-reaching reforms. She has to prove that reform policy is not just a verbal exercise but a reality. Only than Ukraine will be considered as a country seriously committed to reforms. Do not have doubts that only far reaching, painful reforms can convince potential Western investors who are only capable to invest the money necessary for Ukraine's modernization.

Hungary has a strong desire to help Ukraine in the rough road of reforms. During all possible meetings with our EU partners we call their attention on the strategic importance of Ukraine and on the role Hungarian-Ukrainian cooperation can play in helping our neighbour. We consider improving our cooperation with Ukraine as a possible Hungarian contribution to the EU Common Strategy towards Ukraine. We are ready to examine with our Ukrainian as well as EU partners possible ways of our participation in that Strategy.

Sławomir Rębisz

Role of the Carpathian Euroregion in Strengthening and Stabilizing Central Eastern Europe

Introduction

Most of us - the inhabitants of the old continent - realise that Europe determines the shape of its future. The political and economic changes of the recent years have changed significantly the picture of European integration and co-operation between countries. United co-operation is in the interest of all Europeans, in both western and eastern countries.

Along with the fall (1989-1991) of geopolitical division of Europe, perspectives of normal development of outside relations have been opened in front of societies of Central and Eastern Europe. "Normal", meaning such that fulfil the needs and interests of those societies, historically shaped traditions, their mutual connections as well as international relations, consistent with present trends of development.

Such trends, specific for present-day Europe, include fast, sometimes spontaneous development of inter-social bonds as well as contacts between nations inhabiting border areas. As a professor Kuzniar R. states, "*they constitute an element of further European integration process, including supernationalism phenomena (entitlements of European Union organs), sovereignty of countries (subsidization principle), and regionalism, as well as trans-border co-operation.*"³

International aspects of trans-border co-operation

The idea of euroregionalism is not a new phenomenon in the economic and political history of Europe. The initiatives which popularise co-operation between neighbours in various fields have a long-lasting tradition. They were taken up especially in western European countries after World War II and their aim was to eliminate the existing barriers, national conflicts and hatred, which hindered mutual social, political, economic, cultural and other forms of contacts.

³ Prof. Roman Kuzniar - one of the initiators of establishing the Carpathian Euroregion, previously Director of the Planning and Analysis Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry.

Polish initiators of the Carpathian Euroregion perceive trans-border co-operation in a wider perspective. It should take a vital place in the social life, outside relations and foreign policy of a country. There are several reasons.

a) First. Trans-border co-operation is an important form of socializing foreign relations of a country. It cannot be mistaken as socializing foreign policy, which in case of Poland takes place in a manner proper for the democratic state system. Inclusion of society (its part of inhabiting border areas) into international relations takes place through organized and legally based trans-border co-operation. Undoubtedly it facilitates increase of the civilization level of local communities. Constituting an element of strengthening the local democracy, it is also a fragment of a border democratic process, which runs, to a large extent, beyond the borders. Civilization of trans-border contacts, preventing undesirable instinctive events, is a good school of tolerance towards distinctness (cultural, ethnic, religious) related to partners from the other side of the border. Summing up, it is one of the necessary ways of reaching an open civil society.

b) Second. Trans-border co-operation will have to play an important role in international relations in our part of Europe, as a part of the so-called new regionalism or subregional co-operation in Central-East Europe. It is a necessary element of the transformation process of these relations from 1989. This process consists of, among others, giving up the idea of a border related to a wall or wire entanglements, which fulfils almost exclusively dividing and isolating functions, while concentrating on the border as a meeting place, which facilitates development of trust, exchange and co-operation. In this way antagonism and resentments are eliminated and authentic bonds and good relations between neighbours are developed. The example of good trans-border relations radiates to relations between all nations and can be one of international relations stabilizers. The way in which present borders were often established should incline us towards attaching a special importance to trans-border co-operation, just as an international relations stabilizer in our region. It is important that issues in some other countries of the region are similarly perceived. For instance, Ukrainian scientists state that without trans-border co-operation all efforts towards establishing stable connections between Central-East European countries are fated to fail. In their opinion the area of the Eastern Carpathians is a very good place for realisation of this type of project: the Ukrainian Carpathian Region borders four countries of the region.

c) Third. Finally, it should be emphasized, that trans-border co-operation can be an important instrument of strengthening the Polish state and building its position as well as its active role in this part of Europe. Local and regional activity, also in trans-

border dimension, is a fragment of the work of social and state reconstruction of Poland. It is reconstruction that is consistent with the present time demands and guarantees Poland a dignified place in the family of the European nations.

The necessary condition of successful trans-border co-operation is a certain symbiosis between state activity and its policy run from central office and activity of local and regional factors, mainly self-governments. The state (government) policy should create legal confines, eliminate possible barriers and sometimes inspire (at times provide preventive measures in case of undesirable events). The local and regional authorities fulfil co-operation with concrete contents: it is in front of them where the field for various endeavours is wide open. Without their inventiveness, energy and efforts trans-border co-operation will not be possible. The decisive significance will be determined by local communities' interests and benefits, which can be met and satisfied in this way. Recognition of these interests and advantages is a duty of local elites.⁴ (See: Kuzniar, 1999 p.19-21).

Broadly speaking, the new standard of policy in Central and Eastern Europe contributes to the complete environment of change in Poland. At the same time Poland experiences greater security with its seven friendly neighbouring countries. Through the signing of the international agreements - treaties about the good-neighbouring and mutual co-operation with all its bordering countries, Poland gained good conditions for developing of its international co-operation.⁵ (Malendowski, 2000)

The above-mentioned treaties confirmed inviolability of the existing borders and created the guaranteed base of security and stability in this part of Europe.

To consent to governmental foundation of the security policy and defence strategy, Poland does not claim a right to other territories and does not see any country as its own enemy.

To take new challenges in the area of Polish Foreign Affairs policy, Poland has been increasing its activity in international co-operation for 10 years. One of the main activities is regional relationship between two-sided or multi-sided partners.

⁴ Kuzniar R. (1999) *Euroregion Karpacki w polityce zagranicznej Polski (in:) Euroregion Karpacki, Carpathian Euroregion Project Publication, Bydgoszcz.*

⁵ Malendowski W., Szczepaniak M.,(2000) *Rola euroregionów w procesie integracji europejskiej (in:) Euroregiony - mosty do Europy bez granic*, edited by W. Melandowski i M. Szczepaniak, Warszawa.

This co-operation is understood as a tool for developing the stability and security in the region and removing the existing barriers (where different aspects of Communist states' politics divided ordinary people in the region).⁶ (Rebisz, 2000)

Cross-border co-operation is one of the most important components in the Polish strategy of integration and reduction of the distance (economic, social, and so on) to countries in the EU.

Security versus threats

Generally Polish society favours and accepts the National Strategy of Security (I mean about feelings of safety that followed the joining with NATO). These feelings are shown in the results of statistics surveys e.g.: investigating opinion of Polish society about NATO and security of Poland in 1999 (about 75 % were for the military bloc, 15% found it difficult to say and 10% were against).⁷

The main threats that are perceived by Polish society in the country but also in the Podkarpacie region do not refer to any military ones or threats from revision of frontiers and so on.

In my point of view they are mainly fears about domestic economic trouble and resulting personal suffering. The government and society fix their attention on social-economic problems, e.g: unemployment, increasing crime (delinquency) and so on.

In my region which is one of the parts of CE (Podkarpacie voivodeship), the main threats concentrate on these problems:

1. high rate of unemployment (Poland –14%, Podkarpacie voivod. – 15%)
2. fewer and fewer new workplaces
3. agriculture (too many small farms)
4. lower level of economic development than other regions of Poland
5. not many foreign investors or capital expenditure

⁶ Rebisz.S (2000), *Opportunities and needs of intercultural education in the Carpathian Euroregion (the exemple of the Associate of the Carpathian Region Universities)* in: *Edukacja międzykulturowa w Polsce I na świecie*, edited by T. Lewowicki, Katowice.

⁷ Strzeszewski M., (1999), *Od obaw do członkostwa. Polska w NATO, Rzeczpospolita 12/3/1999.*

6. migration of young, well-educated people to other parts of Poland
7. economic fears about joining the EU
8. fears about illegal emigration from the East
9. fears about smuggled goods (radioactive materials, alcohol, cigarettes and so on)
10. fears about prostitution and white slavery
11. recession in Eastern countries
12. pollution of the environment
13. fears about tightening frontiers on the East of Poland after joining the EU.

Conclusion

Europe determines the shape of its future. The political and economic changes of the recent years have changed significantly the picture of European integration and co-operation between countries. United co-operation is in the interest of all Europeans, both western and eastern countries. I am sure trans-border co-operation is the first step toward creating one, safety united Europe in the future which would not be divided into the “rich West” and the “poor East.” We should remember that the basic goals of trans-border co-operation are always the same:

- a) easing tensions and assisting in developing friendly relations between communities of different nationalities, ethnic origin and religion,
- b) improving the living standard of border region communities by supporting their regional development with the help of border regions in other countries.

The trans-border co-operation can then facilitate both social-economic development of border regions, by providing new possibilities for these far and less developed lands, and can introduce a spirit of co-operation to border communities by interpersonal contacts, which constitute the base of any development and contribute to establishing friendly relations between the whole nations.

Trans-border co-operation then is not a goal in its own right, but a certain tool. As a tool, which has many limits, it will surely not resolve all problems existing in our regions. However, it is a useful instrument, which is worth trying. It can contribute to a great extent toward building better mutual understanding and good relations between people and nations of Central-East Europe, which as we remember was never one of the most peaceful parts of our continent.

Poland, Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and other countries have realised the fact that investing in friendly relations between neighbouring countries is always a wise investment. It does not cost so much, but helps tremendously in building bridges, establishing contacts and personal ties, which bring effects faster than anyone could have ever expected. However, it is often difficult to combine this outcome with the formal activity of the Euroregional Organization.⁸ (Helinski, 1998, p.11-14)

It is to be taken into consideration that the integration policy is confirmed or broken in borderline areas. They are the most vulnerable “barometer” of the condition of relationships between nations. It is here that the prejudice, grudges and conflicts or integration and co-operation may be most evident.

It might be stated that the idea of Euroregions in the West has passed its test because it stressed the combined benefits and equality of rights for the partners, and secondly because the border, peripheral regions are not able to suppress the barriers to integration of the local markets without support from outside. Therefore it seems fair to view today’s borders as uniting people, not separating them and to remember a well-known saying that “*friends are to be found close, not far away.*”⁹ (Malikowski, 1997)

Thanks to establishing the Carpathian Euroregion local communities living in this area of Central-Eastern Europe got development instruments for mutually beneficial co-operation between neighbouring countries. Each instrument can be a useful tool. Contents and an outcome of this co-operation will depend on communities themselves, local and regional, self-government as well as administration authorities.¹⁰ (Rebisz, 1999)

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⁸ Heliński P., (1998) *Carpathian Euroregion. Five years of Dialogue and Co-operation*, Krosno.

⁹ Malikowski M., (1997) *Spoleczne aspekty powstania i funkcjonowania Euroregionu Karpackiego* (in:) *Polska i jej wschodni sąsiedzi*. Co-work edited by A. Andrusiewicz, Rzeszow.

¹⁰ Rebisz S., (1999), *Organizacje pozarządowe a rozwój obszarów euroregionalnych (przypadek Fundacji Karpackiej)*, (in:) *Przedsiębiorczość w procesie przemian strukturalnych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej*, edited by K. Jaremczuka, Rzeszow.

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Svitlana Mitryayeva, Olexander Dikaryev
***Role of the Carpathian Euroregion in Strengthening
Security and Stability in Central Eastern Europe***

(Theses)

The 1990s of the 20th century have become the **transition period to the new European order**. Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO in March 1999 became the first practical step, which coincided with the **50th Anniversary of the Alliance**. It is sure that Romania, Slovenia and the next nine European countries **will follow them**.

At the same time EU enlargement is taking place and there have been commenced the negotiations about Poland's, Hungary's, Czech Republic's, Cyprus's, Slovenia's and Estonia's joining EU. The second wave of EU enlargement is being under consideration now: Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Malta and even Turkey. Thirteen European countries in general.

As a result, at the beginning of the century we might face the consolidated Europe which would unite **three groups of states**:

- **19 NATO and EU members** (in enlarged version);
- **states which are not NATO and EU members** but which are gravitating towards them;
- **Russia in the union with Belarus** and may be with some other states of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States).

In this case common Europe will have **the strong core** connected closely with the USA and **outlying area** which is gravitating towards this core.

One should notice that only **Ukraine** and Moldova **fall out** from this conglomerate of European countries.

Regarding **the prospects of the political situation development in Europe**, one should take into account that both NATO and Russia, from the point of view of their nature and interests, remain as yet the structures, which have **different military and political direction**. The latter has been clearly justified by their open opposition regarding NATO military action in Yugoslavia in 1999 and war in Chechnya.

There is no doubt that under such complicated and contradictory circumstances, developed in the Euro-Atlantic region at the beginning of the 21st century, **Ukraine with its 50-million population at last should clearly define the choice of its development policy as the subject of international politics.**

Ukraine **must do it** on the tenth year of its declared independence.

What is the background of this process?

We think that **three important factors** have the impact on the policy of Ukraine and its place in the world.

The first factor: Ukraine is a new and rather unfamiliar state. Ukrainian state institutions are yet comparatively weak, especially regarding the adoption of the main legislative acts, choice of policy and governmental consensus, which are necessary for determining and gaining the long-term economic, political and social well-being. Politically Ukraine is virtually a highly competitive oligarchy, where the factions are interested **first of all** in the distribution of wealth resources and power. Such policy is rather personified and corrupted.

Ukrainian civil society is weak and allows the state to function **without reliable control over its actors.**

The second factor: Ukrainian society is divided, but it has not been caused by **the ethnic division** into Russians and Ukrainians. **Political, economic and regional division** is far more important. The main issue solved in Ukraine was **independence**. For Western and Carpathian region of Ukraine the independence has become the realization of their long-cherished dream. For others – that is for the majority of population of the eastern and southern regions – it has become the fact they should take into account at least. **The majority of other issues** concerning the state and society **remain unsolved**, beginning from private property and ending by culture, language and geopolitical orientation. Fortunately this division does not reflect the ethnic factor and is mostly determined rather by the high level of **the uncertainty of the population and incomprehension of the processes**, than by the profundity. Such differences justify that arguments among the different factions, which determine Ukrainian international politics, concerning the integration with NATO, EU or CIS, are taking place under circumstances of not formed national, political and geopolitical identity of the country on the whole.

The third factor: geopolitically Ukraine remains between two fires. Numerous geopolitical changes, which gave Ukraine the possibility to become the

independent state, did not solve the key question. The country is up to now **at the cross-roads** between **Russia and NATO or EU**. These geopolitical aspects are very **meaningful**. For example Poland is in different situation though has a neighbour – Belarus. Ukraine has a neighbour – Russia – with its own characteristic view of Ukraine. Therefore **the western policy of Ukraine** should take into consideration **the geopolitical factor**. But this factor should not influence the opinion of the West concerning the western development vector of Ukraine.

1. The bipolar world epoch, with the ideological contradictions in its centre over past decades in Europe, which could have drawn the mankind into the global clear war, may be considered **to be over**. It has been caused by some subjective and objective reasons, first of all by ruining socialist system.

Nevertheless the world is still being in the state of uncertainty when the previous contradiction based on the ideology has lost its acuteness and the new one has not been clearly defined yet. Such situation may be called as **“transition epoch”**. It is a general distinctive feature of the contemporary period.

Under conditions of “the transition period”, when the main antagonistic social systems are carrying out changes and looking for the peaceful ways of mutual understanding, the local politico-military crises and military conflicts as their result are the main military danger for CEE region and Euro-Asian continent in general.

2. While analysing the character of contemporary military threats and conflicts, one should take into account the impact of at least **three trends** on their formation, which might be called conditionally as **political, restrain and military trend**. These trends show themselves in the mutual relations among the main states of the world community.

The first trend – *political* – is being developed under the influence of several factors. The main factor is the aspiration of the most countries to build up the common system of international security under the aegis of UNO and regional structures. Such system would prevent the military conflicts between the states and within them or at least would lessen their negative consequences. More often in the world there are being developed situations, when in response to different crises, the world community in the person of UNO in the close interaction with the regional organizations (NATO) creates the supernational military groupings for de-escalation of conflicts not stopping even in front of military violence.

This trend acquires more steady character. Over the past years many different international institutions insistently demand to ensure it in the legislative aspect. It has been proposed to comprehend the mutual dependence of such global principles of international law as **sovereignty, equality of the states and non-interference in their internal affairs**, on the one hand, and a potential right of the world community to intervene in the internal affairs of some states in the case of genocide and mass violations of the human rights there, on the other hand. The new comprehensions have appeared and are being used in the UNO terminology, such as “humanitarian operations” and “compulsion for peace”, the legitimacy of which has been substantiated by art. 42 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Thus in the vision of the world community the international actions directed to compulsion for peace bear **the just character**.

The main criterion of the justice is represented by the UNO resolution based on the legislative standards of the Charter of the United Nations.

And what about Ukraine?! In what way its state security policy corresponds to the character of the above threats? What may be its position regarding this process? It occurs that ensuring stability and security in the neighbouring and other European regions is vital for both Ukraine and any other state, since the security of each country under modern conditions becomes related more closely to stability and security both in the region and in the whole world.

So Ukraine being an active UNO member, and taking into consideration its important geostrategic position, is certainly responsible for keeping up regional and all-European security. Therefore **Ukraine can not stand aside from the peacekeeping operations under the aegis of UNO**. Thus from 1992 our country has been taking part in the peacekeeping operations. Proceeding from the size of its peacekeeping contingents, during 1990-s Ukraine has been on the list of the first 20-30 countries among more than 80 states – peacekeeping participants.

According to the evaluation of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence about 18000 Ukrainian military men and civilians have taken part in the peacekeeping operations.

Nowadays they are performing their noble mission as a part of multinational contingents in Kosovo, Lebanon and Transdnier region. There are intensive preparations for participation in UNO mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In 1999 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed the Law of Ukraine “On the Participation of Ukraine in the International Peacekeeping Operations”. There was underlined that “This law determines legislative, organizational and financial principles concerning Ukraine’s participation in the international peacekeeping operations, as well as the order of direction by Ukraine of the military and civil staff, organization of its training and provision for participation in the activities on maintenance or renewal of the international peace and security”.

What concerns **Carpathian Euroregion and the relations**, for example, between **Ukraine and Poland**, the important fact is creation and employment of **the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion** in Kosovo. It should be stressed that in the previous history of both countries there were examples of the joint activities, including military ones, against the common enemy. But this is the first example of such kind in the modern history. Specific features of this contingent lie in the fact that Poland is an equal member of NATO and Ukraine meanwhile has only the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. So far it is **the unique example** of the bilateral co-operation between the Alliance and the partner-state.

In general it might be taken into consideration that nowadays the system of bodies, structures and state approaches to the participation in the peacekeeping under the aegis of UNO or OSCE is being formed in Ukraine.

But it is insufficient to take measures after the event has taken place already. It would be better rather not to allow genocide than to punish a criminal after the terrible evidence and mass burying places have been revealed. It is insufficient to observe “blue helmets” keeping aside meanwhile the non-human cruelty acts take place.

The emergency situations do need the emergency response. Such situation has been developed in Kosovo nowadays. The results of intervention into this emergency situation are being obtained only now, after change of Milosevich’s regime.

Certainly it should be necessary even in the emergency situations to operate under the aegis of UNO taking into account the situation in the whole world in general. The General Secretary of UNO Kofi Annan has declared that in the new century the main task is “to achieve unity regarding the principle that mass and systematic violations of human rights, wherever they would take place, should not be allowed”.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has confirmed the considerate state policy regarding such problems at UNO Millennium Summit in September 2000.

Thus the world states should establish the leading principles for intervention in the response to the mass violations of humanitarian law and crimes against mankind. It is necessary to widen the competency of UNO Security Council which should act under conditions of general comprehension of the fact that under certain circumstances the military actions are necessary and justified.

While resolving the problems of the state security policy one should take into account some **other trends** related to military and military-technical capacities of the state.

In regard to the Ukrainian military **restrain policy** related to the possibility of a military conflict prevention, one should take into consideration that in military aspect the elements of war prevention existed in western states' doctrines already for a long time, in the form of "restrain" components in their Armed Forces. While the Soviet Union was steadily increasing the enormous stocks of the nuclear weapons, Great Britain and France were reserving moderate stocks of three-component nuclear weapons at the places of dislocation and application (from earth, sea and air) as the restrain weapon, eventually in the case of necessity of the response blow.

What concerns ensuring own security and creating a mechanism of war prevention, unfortunately Ukraine has not chosen the way of "civilized" Great Britain and France, and has not reserved the tactical nuclear weapon as the weapon of restrain.

Ukraine has not created as yet the restrain component on the basis of the conventional armaments too. Hence nowadays the military security of this country is based almost on mere declarations.

The third trend concerns the problem of **the state defence building.**

Naturally the military defence building of the state is to be carried out in the interests of its security and in regard to the existing and potential threats. So we should put some questions.

Is it necessary for neutral Ukraine, under conditions of absence of direct enemy but taking into consideration the contemporary European crises and full-scale terroristic acts, to have efficient Armed Forces? Surely nowadays Ukraine must have the efficient European-type forces.

The paradox is that Ukraine has numerous Armed Forces (about 400 000) which are not planned to be cut out till 2005. Unfortunately they can not be co-related and

compatible with the Western forces through their obsolete expenditure structure and quantity of the central bureaucracy apparatus. It seems that there is no comprehension of the fact that neither land forces nor armoured land vehicles have a decisive role in the local conflicts and wars today, particularly on the densely populated European territories.

3. On the one hand, NATO enlargement has had a positive impact on the security in Ukraine's Western region and in the state in general. It has been related to the fact that NATO-Ukraine co-operation represents for Ukraine certain confidence in ensuring its national security. NATO has become the first neighbour on the borders with Poland and Hungary. But it does not guarantee the security: NATO can not give Ukraine such guarantees since the latter is not a Washington Treaty member. Fortunately in the Charter Ukraine-NATO (1997) there is p.15 about creation by Ukraine and NATO, if necessary, of so-called "crisis consultive mechanism" for holding common consultations in the cases of direct threats to Ukraine's territory integrity and political independence or security.

Fortunately there was not reason for holding such consultations over past three years. One might consider that they have not taken place owing to the existence of the possibility to create, if necessary, this "crisis consultative mechanism" as the guarantor of the regional security in general and Ukraine's national security in particular.

On the other hand, NATO enlargement on the East has evoked Russia's displeasure. Thus Ukraine's declarations about possible joining NATO have been perceived very negatively by its Northern neighbour. Hence more hard demands have been put forward to Ukraine.

Therefore one might conclude that after NATO enlargement Ukraine's confidence in its security has increased while the political situation in the triangle "Ukraine-Russia-NATO" has become tenser.

4. Certainly "softening" NATO Eastern borders already has taken place. These borders are not yet closed by visa regime regarding Ukraine. The future development of the situation depends rather on Ukraine than on Poland or Hungary. Just Carpathian Euroregion with its genuine European mentality of the population may become "a transition belt" or a local transition zone between CEE countries and Ukraine.

5. What concerns **the lessons regarding domestic policy**, under contemporary circumstances it is impermissible in this country to allow internal armed conflicts related to ethnic or some other crises.

What concerns **foreign policy**, certainly Ukraine should aspire to join a politico-military union which could have ensured general and national security of its members. Unfortunately such conditions have not been formed as yet for Ukraine.

The foreign policy of a transition country should facilitate resolution of **internal problems** wherever and whenever possible. For this reason, Ukraine's main foreign policy task at present is the inclusion of potential co-operation with foreign partners (their resources, influence, experience, and practical assistance) for the rehabilitation of the national economy and building of civil society in Ukraine.

The advance of Ukraine's relations with various countries has reached the level of **strategic partnership**. Relevant provisions are stipulated in bilateral documents, which is evidence of the priority of relations in the eyes of both parties. However, in certain cases, Ukraine **uses the mechanism of strategic partnership in an inconsiderable manner**.

As a result of unilateral declarations by Ukrainian politicians, the list of "strategic partners" encompasses nearly twenty states worldwide. Such a practice **casts doubt** as to the existence of **a clearly defined foreign policy strategy in Ukraine**.

Strategic partnership, once declared, should be **effective and advantageous for both parties**, meaning not only **state and political elites** but also **business entities and rank-and-file citizens**.

What concerns **military lessons**, one should ascertain that Kosovo has led the world to the wars of the new generation.

Nuclear weapons were put in the basis of wars of the fifth generation. Nowadays the military theory and practice are carrying out and testing the concepts of the sixth generation wars. The most developed countries will be ready for these wars in 2007-2010. The main aim of the sixth generation wars is rout of the enemy's economic potential and change of the political regime under minimal losses of manpower on either side. In these wars the highly accurate conventional shock and defence weapon created on the new physical principles and certainly information weapon will play the main role. Experts consider the sixth generation wars as information wars as well.

It is evident that the sixth generation wars require principally different armed forces and means of their application in the interests of state defence. Nowadays many countries of the world make intensive preparations for wars of the sixth

generation. As analysis shows, unfortunately Ukraine like the most of CIS countries stubbornly is heading for the war of the previous fourth generation. Mostly it is related to the economical difficulties, but in Ukraine's case it is related to non-comprehension and reluctance to convert the armed forces to more effective and cheaper European standards.

6. A specific problem of Ukraine is that, given European standards, it does not have **full-fledged non-governmental representation** on the international arena: its **civic institutions** are only **weak** and cannot claim **full-scale recognition**. **A few west-oriented foreign policy elite** can not “draw” Ukraine into **new Europe**.

In this context **elite and the public of the Carpathian Euroregion** as an **actor of international relations** in general may play its **role of trans-border co-operation**. Relations with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania should **ensure security and stability on the common borders**. Unfortunately it will take place under visa regime conditions **already in the nearest future**.

The borders of **five postcommunist countries** meet on the territory of the Carpathian Euroregion. They all stand **a good chance** to show their **preparedness for national inegration with EU** and to strengthen stability and security in the region.

Evolution of the events in the countries of the CE is an example of the dialectics of balance of the regional and global levels of the international relations. **Globalization** of the modern system of international relations has an **impact on the concrete plans and activities of the CE**. Thus, accession of three neighbouring countries (Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) to NATO, and **especially the close perspective of their joining EU**, have already led to some **visa problems**.

Just in the framework of the CE, the **negative impact** of visa regime implementation has to be lessened, **using the cross-border contacts**.

The experience of trans-border co-operation of Ukraine shows that regional co-operation may become **the important factor** in solving the existing economic and social problems of **the transition countries**.

Trans-border co-operation development in the framework of the CE project is important not only from **the point of view of its impact on the integration intentions of Ukrainian foreign policy**. It is important in the context of developing **Ukrainian bilateral relations** with the neighbouring CEE countries – Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania – too. Trans-border co-operation development **corresponds fully to the**

basic agreements and may become one of **the tools of their implementation**. It may promote strengthening good-neighbourly relations too.

Active role of Ukraine in developing CE activities **will strengthen its international position in the CEE subregion** and **raise its reputation** as the **serious and constructive European actor**.

In development scenarios for Ukraine for 2001 and further and in its geopolitical priorities as the main task has been defined **transformation** of Ukraine **from object** of the geopolitical games of the Great Powers **into subject** of geopolitics. Together with the regeneration processes of European identity this corresponds to Ukraine's potential and resources as of sovereign European country.

By all means, **inclusion of Ukraine** into the process of building new European security structures (including regional) should be realized first of all with taking into consideration **Central Eastern European factor**.

Adina Tăgîrță

Romanian Participation in the Carpathian Euroregion: Dimensions and Achievements

Introduction

Through the will of our people, Romania is nowadays engaged in important revolutionary transformations, and to be more precisely in two processes extremely important: of democratization of the society, on the basis of pluralism and human rights, and of transition to the market economy. One could then say that we are living in an era where security interests of one country are protected by entirely new basis (of cooperation) and principles (of international law contained in the Helsinki Act and Charter of Paris). Their respect is the only foundation on what we can build **a stable Europe**.

But stability in Europe requires firstly stable European states. But, at the same time, two or more states on the European continent cannot be called stable only for the simple reason that they have a common past, a common frontier, a common form of relief. Generally, the common destiny of a population or a community of a state or on the continent implies *taking common responsibilities*.

By endorsing these ideas and understanding at the same time the importance of their implementation, the efforts of the political leadership of Romania in 1989 and presently were dedicated to one unique goal of „*strengthening a general-European security system*”. It is obvious that with a view of achieving this objective, there were identified and memorized the most pertinent ways of contributing to the affirmation of European security and stability. These were subsequently translated into action plans at national and/or international level. The first level of action is represented by the level of bilateral relations, which aims particularly to stimulate the cooperation between states. One second plan of action refers to the (sub)regional cooperation, which contributes in accordance with different complementary criteria of emergence of a new community of interests and a network of cooperation able in efficiently supporting the peace and the security on our part of the continent. And, finally, the third action plan aims to enforce the multilateral cooperation with other member or non member states of the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Necessity of a regional national policy

Why is it absolutely necessary that a state has to develop its own regional policy? The foreign policy of every state has to have two obligatory components: a policy of good-neighbourly relations, on one hand, and, a regional policy, on the other hand. The answer to the question I was previously raising, is as simple, as eloquent: in order to get efficiency in cooperation, you have to search your partners as closer to home as you can. The success of a transfrontier project depends, therefore, on the involved partners, who have common frontiers.

On the other hand, regional policy might be considered the best way of exploiting the potential of regional structures already existing, and, not at least, an instrument of enforcing regional stability.

Romania's attitude and the implications of euroregionalism on the security interests of our country

Being aware of the advantages brought by its participation to the regional cooperation mechanisms, Romania supports the regional development and transfrontier cooperation. She understood the importance of improving the capacity of local organizations in order to adapt them to the new approaches and alternative models of economic and regional development. In this sense, our country intensified its regional transfrontier activity, and recorded progresses in developing its identity as a provider of regional stability.

This attitude of Romanian state rely mainly on two considerations: the first one has a political nature, and the second – a practical character. At a practical level, the message to be transmitted is that in order to benefit from an indivisible security there is a deep need of united efforts, because „*where there are two, the power is growing*”. At political level, one has understood that transfrontier cooperation forms have an integrative potential which might be considered a “preamble” to the test of a broader integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

One thing I must emphasize here: regional cooperation is not an alternative to integration: **regional cooperation represents a “complement” to integration, or, if you prefer, a first step towards it.**

We want to stress the idea that Romania is not against transfrontier cooperation. At the contrary, she considers it to be part of the general-European process of integration. However, Romanian point of view is that the integration should and

would be decided at states level for every single case, according to well defined principles and criteria, which will offer guarantees and “permanence” to this kind of cooperation.

Romania has made a political choice and this choice is the irreversible orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic integration implies the theoretical and practical acceptance of the regionalism. Consequently, we do not recommend the emergence of a counterproductive position toward a phenomenon which is in a very advanced stage of evolution on European level, but rather a realist national strategy aiming to prevent and reduce the specific risks of these kind of processes.

To consolidate the local autonomy and to promote decentralized (transfrontier) cooperation represent two imperatives in the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Romania. Presently these two goals are in accordance with the juridical norms accepted by our country at the level of European Council (Charter of local autonomy, Framework-convention on the protection of national minorities).

The existence of an international normative “floor”, quite well “crystallized” in this field, does not represent, in itself, an absolute guarantee.

Ignoring the evolution and the rhythm of Romania towards EU integration, particularly primary is the adoption of internal measures aiming to reduce the security risks, “inherent” to this process, for our country. At the same time, the participation of our country to different forms of transfrontier cooperation cannot and should not “tax”, in rhythm and length, the accession process to European and Euro-Atlantic organizations.

Hard and soft security risks and threats

For Romania, the security risks on short and medium term consist in a high degree of probability „to import” specific factors, having a virtually destabilizing character, which derives mainly from transition processes to democracy and market economy. We refer ourselves mainly to economic and social factors – the most capable of undermining the stability and security in this part of Europe, but also the most difficult to handle, in every state separately, as well as in the international community.

Also, if control measures are too “relaxed” in frontier areas belonging to the structure of euroregions, there might appear elements and conditions which would

facilitate the interference and intensification of terrorist phenomena, organized crime, criminal actions, economic criminality, infractions phenomena, drugs traffic, armament, nuclear material, or would encourage the illegal migration of persons from countries with immigration tendencies.

The core of risk factors exist in every recently born structure which implies frontier transparency and intensification of economic and social transfrontier exchanges, but the profitable contribution of regional cooperation can constitute “the engine” of societal evolution in less developed areas of euroregional affinity, can lead to a human-socially homogenized continent. All of this exceeds, through advantages, the negative aspects related to cost and risk, under the condition of adopting, at internal level, measures efficient in preventing risks and potential threats to national safety.

We also mention that our duty is not or should not be to identify risks and threats to which we are submitted, of which we are somehow aware, but rather to identify the modalities and necessary resources for removing or maintaining under control of all destabilizing factors.

Euroregions – characteristics

Euroregions are defined as institutionalized forms of transfrontier cooperation having consulting statute, which participate to concrete programs of economic and social cooperation, without harming their appartenance to the state.

The benefits of such a form of cooperation are indisputable: the galvanization of economic and commercial relations between the member parties; the stimulation of cultural, artistic and scientific exchanges; the cooperation in the field of ecology; the facilitation of contacts among individuals and human communities; providing fast and efficient communication and transport systems; overcoming the difficulties of crossing common frontiers.

The creation of euroregions is conditioned and/or stimulated by several criteria, among which we mention:

- *the lack of potential conflict focuses*, mainly generated by the presence of national minorities;
- *the recognition of the actual frontier and the states adhesion to the principles and regulations of Helsinki process*;

- *a close level of development*, which is supposed to assure a **minimum economic equilibrium**, especially in the field of infrastructure, where traditional transfrontier relations constitute an important element of cooperation;
- *the existence of important local sources or conditions for external finance* for concret programs;
- *the presence of a common historical and cultural inheritance or the existence of marks of geographical unity*, the euroregions being frequently created around a representative form of relief (mountains, see, river, lake);
- *the clear agreement of the state* with the participation of areas of national territory to such structures.

Project of an Euroregion of Carpaths

The idea of creating an **euroregion of Carpaths** was launched in 1991. An year later, the international conference organized at Nyiregyhaza in Northern Hungary has represented the starting point of “putting in concept” (conceptualization) of the two projects. The first, of the Academy of Hungarian Studies referred to the integration of six Polish districts (regions), two Slovakian, three Hungarian, seven Romanian and five Ukrainian, covering 200 000 km² (18 millions inhabitants). The territorial division would have been the following: 10, 2 % Hungarian, 15,1% Slovakian, 16,5 % Polish, 21,9% Romanian and 36,3% Ukrainian, the population being represented as follows: 10,2% Hungarians, 14% Slovaks, 18,2% Romanina, 21,7% Pole and 35,9% Ukrainians. Romania refused this regional distribution and structure and has not even sent its representative to this conference, criticizing at the same time the introduction of the name of Tisa river in the official denomination of euroregion.

The second project, presented by a nongovernmental American organism, the Institute of East-West Studies, stipulated that states should have the same weight as territory and population within the euroregion. The proposal was accepted by the participants in absence of Romania. Slovakia was represented by local deputies from Kosice, Presov and Bardejov, and Polen, Ukraine and Hungary have sent their official governmental representatives.

Carpathian Euroregion was officially shaped with the occasion of a meeting between the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish ministries of defense in the Debrecen city, on 16th February 1993, without Slovakia and Romania.

Transfrontier projects were subsequently elaborated having as main goal the healthy services, organization of commercial exhibitions and the cooperation among policy agencies and universities. The first regional (bargain) exhibition was organized at Jaslo in Pollen in February 1993, when important bargaining agreements were signed and they run into more than 40 millions dollars. In the same connection, the city of Miskoc from din Hungary housed in August 1994 the first conference of leaders of industrial units from Carpathian region. The reunion of the association of chambers of commerce from Carpathian region was held. Rectors of universiti and directors of colleges met twice in Kosice in May 1994 and in Lublin in October 1994, with the purpose of elaborating common didactic and research projects. An informative bulletin concerning the Carpathian Euroregion is regularly published in each of the local languages and in English.

In 1994 there were established contacts for the cooperation with the Euroregion Maas-Rhin (Belgian, Holland, Germany). In the same year was created the Foundation for Development of Carpathian Euroregion, which is responsible with the promotion of transfrontier sectorial cooperation in the following areas: Heves, Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen, Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg, Hajdu-Bihar and Szolnok (Hungary); Ruesow, Przemyls, Krosno (Pollen); Baia Mare, Braşov and Suceava (România); Bardejov, Kosice, Presov, Svidnik, Humenne, Vranov, Velke Kapusany, Michalovce (Slovakia); Lvov, Ivano-Franskovsk (Ukraine). The proposals launched by this foundation concern integrated projects of rural development, based on an ecological conception, especially in mountainous areas. The Program for Development of Integrated Rural Communities (IRCD) was financially supported with 160 000 dollars during three years, starting with 1997.

The option of Central and East-European countries for the integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, appreciated as an essential factor of preserving their national safety, represents a political process which will fundamentally change, in dimension and implication terms, the configuration of European security and implement a new political and economic model at continental level.

In 1986, European Commission has adopted several measures aiming to support EU regional policy (Packet Delors). These measures emphasize the role of stimulating the development in the regions, the recovering of the areas affected by industrial decline, the decrease of unemployment, the professional integration of young persons and a closer cooperation between member states, on one hand, and local and regional authorities, on the other hand, in accordance with the subsidiary principle.

Considerations on security effects of the first wave of NATO enlargement

Before the first wave of NATO enlargement, there were plenty of scenarios with different views on how the enlargement of the North-Atlantic Alliance will proceed in this part of European continent. Of course, that in the most optimistic scenario it was desirable that countries belonging to the same geopolitical area, as it is the case of the five states participating to the Carpathian Euroregion, would have been simultaneously admitted into the North-Atlantic Organization. However, the contrary case of a selective admittance of certain European candidates countries only will not affect, and, as we have seen, did not affect the relationship between the admitted and non-admitted states into the Atlantic structure. More than that, the Romanian-Hungarian Treaty stipulates: “*They shall mutually support each other’s efforts aimed at integration to the European Union, NATO and Western European Union*”. We consider that this statement neutralize any kind of speculation or concern about the emergence of new potential tensions between the new member state and the still non member state. We understand through “support” that the party to the treaty as new NATO member will offer to the other party the same quantity of support and as it was available since before its integration.

The countries which were not admitted with the first wave of enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance, will understand that between the member and non member statute of an international security organism there an entire spectrum, quite wide of forms of cooperation (politico-military), which is waiting to be capitalized.

In this sense, we must emphasize the more growing importance of participating to mechanisms of (sub)regional transfrontier cooperation. Therefore, **(sub)regional cooperation will play complementary role in maintaining a close between the new NATO members and the other who still have to wait.** In the same connection, we can assert that **euroregions should be considered complementary instruments of compensation for a “differentiated membership”.**

In this sense, **Carpathian Euroregion represent a good regional example of transfrontier cooperation.** The opening of frontiers, the encouragement of tranfrontier communication and freedoms, the creation of international local agencies, of small dimensions, can work in the benefit of resident populations in the euroregion. Conceived as a transfrontier instrument of cooperation, the Carpathian Euroregion evolved and became **a true regional entity.**

In evaluating and identifying the benefits brought by transfrontier cooperation within Carpathian Euroregion to the enforcement of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe, we distinguish *two levels of analysis*: a national and a local level.

At states national level, there is a need to intensify the political relations and the interconnections between Carpathian countries, which will stimulate on middle and long term the evolution of good neighbourly relationship.

At local level, new systems of local authority were created and they enjoy from the freedom of initiating regional projects. The contacts at local level represent the most efficient ways of strengthening the cooperation among countries and people with different outlook and culture. That is why the local level can be the most suitable for establishing contacts and for discouraging potential inherent tensions between different people as nation and nationality.

At the same time, we consider that the efficiency of the type of cooperation promoted by the mechanisms of Carpathian Euroregion is easier to achieve at lower level, among regions with common needs and security interests, than it would have been at a higher level, meaning between states. For instance, open frontiers determine *a double refreshment* of tourism and commerce. With the intensification of commercial exchanges (economic security and stability) at frontiers, there is a chance that new transfrontier jobs opportunities will emerge, which will lead to a decrease of unemployment generally.

The importance of participation to forms of transfrontier cooperation. Opportunities of cooperation

Transfrontier cooperation in these regions can be considered a way for conflict prevention, as well as an additional instrument of regional development. It equally stimulates the decentralization and the development of local democracy. As a result of their potential of enforcing regional stability and security, regional cooperation structures (euroregions, trilaterals) are facilitating the economic development in the area, eliminating all factors that generate tensions, helping, not at least, to disseminate the democratic principles in the area which is the subject of subregional cooperation.

More concretely, the euroregions propose a wide list of opportunities of cooperation, among which we mention, as an example: the interconnecting of electric networks, the encouragement of tourism and touristic industries in the area,

the galvanization of economic and commercial relations on both sides of the frontier, the creation of new jobs, etc..

Given the idea that the stability of the states in the region can be threatened nowadays, both inside (economic crisis, social and ethnic conflicts) and outside of the states (tensions among neighbouring countries, hegemonic tendencies, economic problems, terrorist actions, massive migrations), it becomes necessary to adopt measures of transnational strength of European stability. With other words, it will not be sufficient to develop a level of bilateral cooperation and collaboration with the neighbouring countries or those belonging to the same geopolitical area, we must at the same time think in Europe terms, because it seems that we are moving towards frontier flexibilization, which might blaze the trail to an Europe of regions.

Conclusions

A stable Europe should be build where the social, military, economic security is provided firstly at a regional, local level, since regional communities, on minimum plane, and states, on maximum plane, are the only permanent relaties capable of constantly creating new forms of cooperation, while the adversities between them are temporary.

A strong civil society should be build, which although diversified, would make people “minoritary”, “regional” in numerical terms only, but never from the point of view of the rights and oppportunities they have.

In conclusion, the option of a state to participate to (sub)regional forms of cooperation, is the option of a democratic socially responsible state, which respects the state of law, statal sovereignty, human rights and national minorities. To mechanism of regional cooperation participate those states only, which are searching for a reliable security system which has the merit to get us closer to a civilised and stable international order.

SELECTED DISCUSSION ADDRESSES

Serhiy Kostyuk (The Ukrainian Center for Economic & Political Studies of Olexander Razumkov)

Cross-border co-operation retains great potential for Ukraine due to common border with associate members of the EU. Ukraine's full-fledge collaboration with border countries and maximum use of geopolitical potential of the Carpathian Euroregion will fill the declared strategic course – joining the EU with practical essence. It is not possible to integrate entire Ukraine's area immediately. Therefore, gradual eurointegration of its separate regions seems to be an effective tool.

Common Strategy of the EU towards Ukraine (Helsinki, 1999) stipulates that “the EU will encourage the development of initiatives on regional co-operation between Ukraine and neighbor countries by existing programmes for a specified purpose, special attention will be paid for problems of border economy, including technical modernization of border crossings on Ukraine's state border with neighbor countries. The EU will also develop its programmes aimed to further evolution of the infrastructure of transport networks to promote economic co-operation in the region.

The Carpathian Euroregion as an institution of cross-border co-operation not only assist to solve common problems of border territories (arranging border infrastructure, fight against illegal migration, smuggling of arms and drugs, environment protection, preventing natural disasters, separatism, ethnic conflicts) but also plays the role of “stabilizer” within the region, diminishing tension cause by NATO and EU enlargement eastward.

However, the potential of the Carpathian Euroregion has not been realized yet. In my opinion, the following proposals will promote effective use of regional integration as an important factor of the process of European integration of Ukraine.

- 1. Elaborate and adopt the common strategy for the development of the Carpathian Euroregion.** This document must take into account interests of every parts of the Euroregion in the context of the current geopolitical situation in Europe. Its adoption is an imperative of the moment.
- 2. Extend economic co-operation between border regions of Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.** It's worth to achieve a high level between

aforesaid subjects of co-operation before the first wave of EU enlargement. Henceforward Ukraine would have its own lobby within the EU. Close co-operation within the framework of the Euroregion would also prevent Ukraine from “paper iron” on its way towards Europe. Thus, cancellation of the visa’s procedure between Ukraine and its western neighbors is the priority task .

- 3. Strength cross-border co-operation using financial and technical support of EU programmes (TACIS, PHARE, CREDO, INOGATE, TRACECA, INTERREG Initiatives).** These programmes afford to involve additional financial resources in order to develop cross-border co-operation. It also means additional working places for the region that traditionally has high unemployment rate.
- 4. Improvement information support of the Carpathian Euroregion.** Joint information area of the Euroregion should be created. This area should include representatives of local authorities, NGOs, research and academic institutions etc. Better information about the Euroregion will help to win a broad public support for its activities both inside and outside this association.

Eva Kiss (The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine)

While analyzing the question of security and stability strengthening in Central-Eastern European region, it’s expedient to distinguish the following segments:

- Strategically important role of the Carpathian Euroregion for Ukraine and in particular for the countries of the Central-Eastern Europe in strengthening of different security and stability spheres on the local level
- Significance of the international border in Europe under reform circumstances of the EU as a whole and of the question of formation of “new” external (eastern) borders of the EU specifically in particular and the Ukrainian attitude to this point
- Real ways of security enforcing in multicultural border region of Central-Eastern Europe – as holding of permanent monitoring and determination of possible conflict situations in the region

In fact determining the security as a feeling or as a certain state when possible threats are factually blocked by certain guarantee factors or mechanisms – which is functional and correct, the security in particular in legal respect first of all is a system of guarantees. So, as a fact it could be stated that today the search of security guarantees (of it’s various spheres) by the Central-Eastern European states

is already finished. Thus Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have exactly determined their euroatlantic position – the entering NATO and EU. According to the last Report of European Commission in 2000, the admission of the new applicants of the “first wave” into the EU is planned on years 2003-2004, but this also depends not only on the Central-Eastern European countries conformation to exact EU criteria, but this also depends on the dynamics of EU reform.

It was stated, that according to the Deutsche Bank researches in the year 2000, the admission of the new members into the EU is waited not earlier than in year 2005. However in new millennium the Central-Eastern European States will become the members of already new EU and the main point is how soon will these states adapt to new economic and military-political realities in already new reformed “united” Europe and to what extent is the EU able to “finance” own enlargement to the East – as a spread of the sphere of own interest in the region.

In this context its worth to mark that as the NATO joining so the entry into such an elitarian club as EU is – also determines the system of guarantees for new members of the EU. An important point in this respect is the Ukraine’s attitude to the NATO and EU enlargement to the Ukraine’s borders - as a sphere of their interest spreading in the Central-Eastern European region. However the territorial location of the CEE states, the significance of multicultural border Carpathian region acquires an important and strategic meaning under these conditions. The “Doom” of the CEE states to the cooperation with Ukraine is the necessary condition of their social-economic development even in condition of Shengen Visa Regime introduction:

Firstly, the states of the region on their social-economic development and the availability of high standards of competition able production on the internal EU market after the EU entry will search for the new forms of cooperation with Ukraine.

Secondly, all the states of the Carpathian Euroregion have stable legitimate interest to the representatives of their nations, who form the national minorities in neighbouring border states. Thus, the investigation of possible conflict ethnopolitical situation on the last EU border and the Ukrainian border really determines the strategic importance of the Carpathian Euroregion, for example, the reasonability of forming the permanently acting research Centre of possible conflict situations in multicultural border region between the EU and Ukraine.

Thirdly, the dynamic development of border territories according to the European pattern already begins, because the EU now already invests into the

development of new “eastern” border infrastructure – what is also strategically important as for Ukraine, so for the EU.

In the context of stability development in the CEE region. Also its ought to distinguish such two important points as the strengthening a dynamics of the migration wave through the Carpathian Euroregion and the ensuring the ecological security of states of the region.

Thus, today, in conditions of Euro-Atlantic integration and nivelation of the internal EU borders – as the borders between the EU states become more and more transparent as concerning information so the economics, its ought to mark (and this is, by the way, a sad fact for the Ukraine) that the EU is already strengthening its “external” borders and certainly will further strengthen them. For example, the Shengen Visa Regime introduction is only one of the important guarantee system that EU gives to own member states.

The European dimension of Ukraine, practical movement of Ukraine to the European integration today is really possible namely in the dynamic development of transfrontier and interregional cooperation. The conceptual elaboration of the European regional policy for Ukraine is that real condition and strategically important objective necessity, which today determines the Eurointegrational dimension of Ukraine.

Thus, one of the forms of the effective transfrontier cooperation in Europe is the activity of the Euroregions, the development of which since the end of the II World War promoted the nivelation of controversies in certain extent of between the states and gradually made the borders symbols in the conditions of general European Integration. Namely this form of transfrontier cooperation as one of the most effective political models of promoting transfrontier cooperation is to become in the Carpathian Euroregion the stabilizing factor of international relations in Europe along the real international borders between the EU and Ukraine.

Thus, from the point of view of the nivelation of the ethno-political and ecological, and also the other problems, strategically important factor for Ukraine and the EU is the effective usage already available possibilities and internal potential of the Carpathian Euroregion with the aim of prevention the appearance of before crisis situations or avoid from different forms of threats on the local, regional levels.

Otto Kovchar (The Transcarpathian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Uzhgorod)

Would like to thank to the organizers for the invitation and granting of an opportunity to take part in discussion of a role and place Carpathian Euroregion in strengthening safety both stability in Central and East Europe as the given question is extremely urgent taking into account those processes, and also problem, which exist for a today's day in our countries. Taking into account ledges, which today have here sounded, a few words would likes summing up to tell about transborder cooperation.

The countries of Europe are the important trade partners of Ukraine. Turnover by the goods with the countries of Europe makes more third from commerce of Ukraine with the whole world. Ukraine carried out foreign trade with the countries of Europe rather actively. Important there is that fact, that the rates of growth of export-import transactions of Ukraine with the countries of Europe in 9 months 2000, in comparison with 9 months 1999, exceed rates of growth of export-import transactions of Ukraine with other countries of the world. It testifies to essential activization trade and ekonomical relations of Ukraine with the European countries.

Speaking about crossborder cooperation, I want to specify, that the experience of the European states in formation of strategy of regional development for Ukraine is very important. As a rule, in a basis of regional strategy our neighbours complex use total resources of potential, independence of regions in organization of the plans of socio economic development and their realization is put.

In connection with expansion the EU and direct approach it to borders of Ukraine is got of deciding importance of a problem of the mutual coordination of the plans of territorial development crossborders of areas of our states, standards concerning development nettings of networks and service infrastructure, by throughputs of transport highways and items of transition of border.

In conditions of an achieved level of cooperation has ripened necessity to have the common concept of formation and development joint borders of a zone. For realization it first of all it is necessary to develop necessary agreement-legal base, and then preparation and conclusion of the appropriate Agreements about cooperation crossborders of regions follows, that should be one of priorities in this direction. The purpose of the conclusion of such Agreements in the first turn, in my opinion, should be elimination of obstacles for free moving in crossborders regions of the goods, services, capitals, made in their limits and intended for consumption on these territories.

In 2000 was subscription the intergovernmental Agreement with Slovak Republik about crossborders cooperation. The conclusion of the Agreement is planned during visit of the Premier-minister of Ukraine in Slovak Republik on December 5-6, 2000.

Long-term experience of interaction and integration of the states confirms, that the most favorable conditions for integration in international economic structures have crossborders territory. It explanation first of all by a contiguity of territories and small distance between the subjects of foreign trade activities. Besides, here better infrastructure is advanced integration. The important role in formation crossborders regions plays ethnic affinity of the population, which lives on boundary territories, many with which own language country-neighbourhood, contacts between neighborhood, similarity of cultures and psychology are advanced.

Direct the factors are the most favorable for debugging crossborders cooperation.

If to set a question about effectiveness of participation of the Ukrainian party in such international structures, or whether used we all opportunities, which open before us, the answer will not be unequivocal.

First, the development of the international attitudes crossborders areas requires active support and direct participation of central bodies of state authority, in particular, concerning entry in international regional organizations: Chamber of regions of Council European, Committee of regions of European Union, Assembly of European regions and so forth.

Secondly, cooperation within the framework of existing euroregion demands coordination by central bodies of authorities to the full to use their organizational and financial opportunities.

One more aspect crossborders cooperation is caused by the introduction country - our neighbourhood in European Union, that can result in certain restrictions for Ukraine, in connection with measures by the initiated advanced European countries for protection of the economic space. Therefore, for the prevention of undesirable development of events it is necessary to think over and consistently to embody a lot of effective counteroffer:

— Gradual transition from trade-intermediary to production-investment foreign economic relations on the basis development of international cooperation and attraction straightforwards foreign investments;

- Creation of favorable conditions for development of small business, first of all in agrarian sector of economy (tax, credit, customs policy(politics));
- Formation crossborders bank network and crossborders commercial and industrial organizations;
- Priority development of technical and economic structures, which provide crossborder cooperation (transport highways and their service, airports, stations, hotels, motels, car-care center, refuelling stations, d'ldlârë î÷-îf' a warehouse network, auto ports, communication, sphere of services, trade);
- Acceleration of creation of a zone of free trade;

Braking processes of development euroregionals structures, where Ukraine participates, defines necessity of coordination of actions and association of financial and material opportunities of their participants for intensifikacions crossborder cooperation; spare by him greater attention in indikation the regional and state plans of development areas formations, and also in the forecasts of a national level.

In connection with increase crossborder migration processes, all regions of the countries participant Karpathian Euroregion it is necessary to accept active participation in development, preparation and signing of the agreements from various aspects of the international attitudes on questions labour seat and labour abroad.

By undoubtedly determining direction the crossborder cooperation is development crossborders areas an infrastructure. I count, that the holding factors of development of the international economic relations are insufficient quantity items transition of border, proper equipped motorways, difference in the standards of the size of a railway way and not proper use of a "serving" infrastructure.

Was Next year expediently to make active work on realization of seminars, business-forums and other similar measures with participation of the representatives governmental and business circles of Ukraine both countries Central and East Europe - members Karpathian Euroregion, that comprehensive discuss all these questions, and it in turn only can positively be displayed on expansion of further cooperation of regions both strenghtening of safety and stability in Central and East Europe.

TABLES AND FIGURES*

Table 1: Ranking of the 18 most urgent threats perceived by Slovak public after disintegration of Czechoslovakia (% of those who answered “definitely yes” or “rather yes than no”)

1. Growing crime and chaos	88
2. Worsening co-operation and contacts with the Czech Republic	78
3. Activities of foreign Mafia laundering “dirty money”	74
4. Disability of the political representation to respect and protect country’s interests	69
5. Economic decline and misery	68
6. Escalation of tensions in relations with Hungary	66
7. Wave of strikes and disturbances	60
8. Lack of interest of developed countries in investing to Slovakia	58
9. Sell-out of country’s property to foreign capital	57
10. Growing ethnic and race intolerance	46
11. Negative international image of Slovakia in the world	45
12. Excessive interference of Church in domestic politics	42
13. Reduction of individual freedom	36
14. Excessive influence of Jews on economic and political affairs	29
15. Dependence on USA	29
16. New nationalisation of private property	18
17. Threat by Ukraine	12
18. Russia’s imperialism	11
Source: Centrum pre socialnu analyzu (Centre for Social Analysis) (<i>Aktualne problemy Slovenska po rozpade CSFR</i> , March 1993, p. 10)	
Note: Respondents could choose three problems. Therefore the total exceeds 100 per cent	

* Tables (1-29) are constituent part of the paper "Threats Perception in the Slovak Republic and Slovak Security Policy: Thinking about Role of the Carpathian Euroregion" submitted by Alexander Duleba, Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

Tables (31-36) and graphs (1-4) are constituent part of the paper "Role of the Carpathian Euroregion in Strengthening and Stabilizing Central Eastern Europe" submitted by Slawomir Rębisz, Pedagogical University (Rzeszow) and presents some results of the public poll conducted by author within the area of the Carpathian Euroregion.

Table 2: “Which problems in Slovakia do you consider most pressing?” (%)

	September 1996	October 1997	January 1999
Living standard, social security	64	67	56
Unemployment	44	39	48
Crime, personal safety	35	43	36
Health care	15	14	33
Economics	25	14	22
Democracy, political culture	36	38	15
Ethics, quality of human relations	14	16	15
Housing	7	7	13
Schools and education	8	4	10
Drugs abuse	6	5	4
Ethnic problems	6	6	3
Environment	1	3	1
Foreign policy	1	4	1

Source: FOCUS, Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs), 1997, 1998, 1999

Note: Respondents could choose three problems. Therefore total exceeds 100 per cent

Table 3: Ranking of problems that have to be solved from citizens' point of view (%)

	I/1997	I/1998
Crime	62	66
Unemployment	60	65
Living standard	65	65
Health care	48	50
Human relations	43	36
Housing	29	29
EU and NATO integration	11	18
Environment	18	14
Operation of state authorities	13	12
Quality of services	19	11
National minorities	6	7
Other	4	2

Source: Ustav pre vyskum verejnej mienky pri Statistickom urade Slovenskej republiky (Public Opinion Research Institute at the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic), 1998

Note: Respondents could choose three problems. Therefore total exceeds 100 per cent

Table 4: Perception of external threats (%)

Threat by	Russia	Germany	USA	Neighbouring countries
1992	26	21	5	46
1996	51	32	22	36
1998	45	23	24	30

Source: New Democracies Barometer, 1999

Table 5: "Would NATO membership provide more favourable conditions for domestic developments in Slovak Republic?" (%)

	...if Slovakia had joined NATO	...if Slovakia had not joined NATO	NATO membership could not affect it	Don't know
...security would be strengthened	36	8	20	35
...economic development would be improved	22	12	31	35
...democracy would be more strong	20	8	39	33
...expenditure on Army would become lower	12	32	10	46

Source: Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, January 1999)

Table 6: "Are you of favour of Slovakia's membership in EU and NATO?" (% of responses: "yes" : "no" : "don't know")

	October 1997	April 1998	January 1999
European Union	74 : 14 : 12	79 : 11 : 10	62 : 22 : 14
NATO	52 : 35 : 13	58 : 31 : 11	42 : 41 : 17

Source: Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs), 1999

Table 7: Trust in EU and NATO (% of trust : % of distrust : % those without definite position)

	October 1993	December 1994	January 1997	October 1997	January 1999
EU	57 : 28 : 15	48 : 28 : 24	48 : 22 : 30	53 : 23 : 24	49 : 31 : 20
NATO	45 : 38 : 17	42 : 33 : 25	39 : 29 : 32	41 : 33 : 26	37 : 42 : 21

Source: FOCUS, October 1993, December 1994, January 1997; Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, October 1997, January 1999)

Table 8: "What will be the consequences of Slovakia's exclusion from the first wave of EU expansion?" (%)

Negative	42
None	22
Positive	4
Don't know	32

Source: Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, October 1997)

Table 9: "Which of following countries do you view as acceptable partners for Slovakia?" (% of affirmative answers)

	EU countries		Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland		USA		Russia	
	1997	1999	1997	1999	1997	1999	1997	1999
Business partners	86	82	81	84	65	68	47	50
Political partners	79	75	49	82	48	57	10	31
Military allies	68	63	65	74	45	48	21	25

Source: Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, October 1997, January 1999)

Table 10: "Are you of favour of (?): (% of responses: "yes" : "no" : "don't know")

	October 1997	April 1998	January 1999
Military and political alliance with Russia	10 : 73 : 17	9 : 76 : 15	13 : 68 : 19
Neutrality of the Slovak Republic	36 : 42 : 22	32 : 50 : 18	34 : 42 : 24
Source: Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs), 1999			

Table 11: "When was life better for people like you: before or after 1989?" (%)

Before 1989	About the same	Today	Don't know
54	24	17	5
Source: Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, October 1997)			

Table 12: "What is the direction of the development of the Slovak society?" (%)

Wrong	Right	Don't know
69	20	11
Source: International Republican Institute/FOCUS, May 1998		

Table 13: "Compared to the pre-1989 regime, the current one has:"

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997
Many more advantages	12	10	11	13	10
Slightly more advantages	29	24	26	30	26
Is about the same	18	13	16	17	18
Slightly more disadvantages	21	20	19	19	21
Many more disadvantages	16	31	26	20	21
Don't know	4	2	3	2	4
Source: Centre for Social Analysis, January 1992, March 1993; FOCUS, December 1994, December 1995, January 1997					

Table 14: "People like me do not have an impact on where the society is heading" (%)

Agree	Disagree	Don't know
80	17	3

Source: Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, October 1997)

Table 15: Rates of actual and potential political participation in Slovakia (%)

Political activity	In the past	In the future
Voting in local elections	73	83
Voting in general election	72	81
Joining the others in solving a community problem	42	78
Contacting an official (MP, mayor, etc.) in order to solve a problem	41	73
Signing a petition	52	71
Joining a group or organisation pursuing your interests	32	66
Attending political meetings	38	52
Attending protest demonstrations	26	50
Convincing friends how to vote	26	41
Joining strikes	12	41
Commenting on political matters in press, radio, television	10	36
Working in a political party	17	34
Running for office	8	23

Source: USAID and FOCUS, February 1998

Table 16: Confidence in Slovak Political Institutions (% of trust : % of distrust)

	December 1994	February 1996	October 1997	February 1998	June 1998	November 1998	January 1999
Constitutional Court	61:26	61:24	63:28	-	68:20	61:22	62:26
President	67:31	52:43	53:43	-	-	-	-
Parliament	57:38	48:43	41:52	34:57	43:48	57:28	57:34
Government	52:43	40:52	35:61	29:64	36:60	55:33	57:37

Source: FOCUS 1994, 1996, 1998; Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, 1997, 1998, 1999)

Table 17: "How did your financial situation changed in the last year?" (%)

	1995	1996	1997
Has improved	13	17	17
Has not changed	40	49	39
Has worsened	47	34	42
Don't know	1	2	2
Source: Ustav pre vyskum verejnej mienky pri Statistickom urade Slovenskej republiky (Public Opinion Research Institute at the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, January 1995, May 1996, December 1997)			

Table 18: Crime rate in the Slovak Republic

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Registered criminal offences	146 125	137 713	114 579	99 402	92 395
of which:					
Homicides	137	129	128	132	140
Robberies	1 500	1 275	1 310	1 274	1 199
Battery	4 382	4 222	4 464	4 348	3 955
Solved criminal offences	52 981	51 327	49 153	45 116	43 642
of which:					
Committed under alcohol	8 922	8 126	6 953	6 794	7 065
Homicides	111	111	112	105	91
Robberies	855	771	879	895	814
Battery	3 769	3 668	3 706	3 594	3 340
Perpetrators	51 746	48 803	45 122	45 349	43 809
of which:					
Not convicted before	37 790	36 831	35 306	36 167	35 008
Habitual offenders	13 956	11 972	9 816	9 182	8 801
Children and juveniles	10 944	9 628	9 183	10 595	10 159
Damages caused by criminality in total (mill. SKK)	6 000,2	5 187,2	9 688,6	9 738,3	9 486,4
Source: Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky (Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic) (Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic, 1998, p. 545)					

Table 19: Ranking of public sectors affected by corruption according to public opinion (%)

	1996	1997	1998
Health care	66	67	69
Schools and education	30	29	34
Justice and courts	30	23	24
Privatisation and state economy	34	23	22
Enterprise	26	18	18
Police	17	14	17
Regional, district and municipality administration	11	14	13
Employment agencies	-	8	8
Banks	12	9	8
Taxation offices	10	7	7
Bureau of customs	11	5	6
Trade licence offices	4	4	3
Source: Ustav pre vyskum verejnej mienky pri Statistickom urade Slovenskej republiky (Public Opinion Research Institute at the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic), 1999			
Note: Respondents could choose three sectors. Therefore total exceeds 100 per cent.			

Table 20: Population of the Slovak Republic by nationality

Nationality	1993		1995		1997	
	Absolute number*	%	Absolute number*	%	Absolute number*	%
Slovak	4 573 711	85,71	4 599 597	85,69	4 614 547	85,65
Hungarian	568 545	10,65	568 368	10,59	568 291	10,55
Romanians (Gipsy)	82 591	1,55	85 073	1,59	87 779	1,63
Czech, Moravian, Silesian	56 801	1,06	58 248	1,08	59 005	1,10
Ruthenian and Ukrainian	31 187	0,58	31 962	0,60	32 496	0,60
German	5 386	0,10	5 382	0,10	5 365	0,10
Polish	2 973	0,06	3 090	0,06	3 186	0,06
Russian	1 614	0,03	1 771	0,03	1 967	0,04
Other and not declared	13 647	0,26	14 299	0,26	15 014	0,27
Total	5 336 455	100	5 367 790	100	5 387 650	100
Source: Statisticka rocenka Slovenskej republiky (Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic, 1998, p. 161)						
Note (*): Absolute number as of December 31 st						

Table 21: Perception of threat by ethnic groups and minorities in Slovakia (%)

1992	1996	1998
53	48	43
Source: New Democracies Barometer, 1999		

Table 22: "How would you characterise the government policy toward ethnic Hungarians?" (%)

	Confrontational	Correct	Too moderate	Don't know
Slovaks	30	38	15	17
Ethnic Hungarians	92	5	1	2
Source: Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, October 1997)				

Table 23: "Conditions for the development of Hungarian minority, when compare them with Slovak majority, are:" (%)

	Views of ethnic Hungarians			Views of Slovaks		
	1994	1997	1999	1994	1997	1999
Less favourable	47	71	63	2	4	5
Equal	49	24	33	63	68	58
Better	0	2	1	31	22	26
Don't know	4	3	3	5	6	11
Source: FOCUS: December 1994, January 1997; Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, January 1999)						

Table 24: Confidence of ethnic Hungarians in governments headed by PMs Vladimir Meciar and Mikulas Dzurinda (%)

	Trust	Distrust	Don't know
Government of PM V. Meciar (1994-1998)	8	84	8
Government of PM M. Dzurinda (since October 1998)	76	13	11
Source: Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs, June 1998, January 1999)			

Table 25: "Would you be willing to allow the Romanies...?" (% of positive answers)

to live in this country	75,5
to live in your village	10,0
no answer	5,4
nothing	5,0
to marry your child	1,7
to live in your quarter	1,7
to live in your neighbourhood	0,8
Source: Dokumentacne centrum pre vyskum slovenskej spolocnosti (Documentation Center for the Research of Slovak Society, 1995)	

Table 26: Acceptance or rejection of discriminatory measures against Romanies (%)

Tending to discriminatory measures	69,9
Rejecting discriminatory measures	4,6
Indifferent position	25,7
Source: Dokumentacne centrum pre vyskum slovenskej spolocnosti (Documentation Center for the Research of Slovak Society, 1995)	

Table 27: Perception of threat by immigrants and refugees (%)

1992	1996	1998
23	28	40
Source: New Democracies Barometer, 1999		

Table 28: Number of refugees in Slovak Republic, 1993-1998

Year	Asylum applicants	Granted asylum	Rejected applications	Stopped proceedings	Applications in proceedings
1993	96	38	20	25	45
1994	140	54	32	65	34
1995	359	66	57	190	80
1996	415	128	62	193	112
1997	645	65	84	539	69
1998	506	49	36	224	-
Total	2 248	455	291	1 236	-

Source: Ministerstvo vnutra Slovenskej republiky (Ministry of Interior of Slovak Republic), 1999

Table 29: Crimes connected with state borders

	1996	1997	1998
Number of illegal border crossings	221	206	419
Number of green-border-guides	537	392	783
Number of illegal emigrants	2 267	2 522	7 752

Source: Ministerstvo vnutra Slovenskej republiky (Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, 1999)

Table 30: The most serious barriers that hamper the co-operation within Carpathian Euroregion

Barriers	Yes	Difficult to say	Yes	Difficult to say
Legal and administrative barriers	83,9%	12,8%	3,3%	100%
Barriers rooted in history and old conflicts (psychological barriers)	82,5%	10,3%	7,1%	100%
Lack of sufficient and reliable information about others countries	80,9%	9,6%	9,5%	100%
Barriers created by national financial and banking systems	74,1%	9,8%	16,1%	100%
Lack of sufficient border check-points and their very poor infrastructure	67,7%	17,8%	14,5%	100%

Table 31: Willingness to join the NATO

			Country					Total
			Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Romania	Ukrain	
Willingness to join the NATO	Yes, definitely for`	Count	91	58	68	105	72	394
		Column %	60,7	38,7	45,6	67,3	46,8	51,9
	Yes`	Count	52	52	48	30	55	237
		Column %	34,7	34,7	32,2	19,2	35,7	31,2
	No`	Count	5	8	10	9	16	48
		Column %	3,3	5,3	6,7	5,8	10,4	6,3
	No, definitely against`	Count	2	19	18	6	5	50
		Column %	1,3	12,7	12,1	3,8	3,2	6,6
	Difficult to say`	Count	0	13	5	6	6	30
		Column %	0	8,7	3,4	3,8	3,9	4,0
	Total	Count	150	150	149	156	154	759
		Column %	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Table 32: Willingness to join the NATO

	Yes	Difficult to say	No	Total
Count	631	48	80	759
Row %	83,1	6,3	10,5	100,0

Table 33: Willingness to join the EU

			Country					Total
			Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Romania	Ukrain	
Willingness to join the EU	Yes, definitely for`	Count	67	115	91	120	105	498
		Column %	44,1	76,2	59,5	76,9	68,2	65,0
	Yes`	Count	59	29	40	27	44	199
		Column %	38,8	19,2	26,1	17,3	28,6	26,0
	No`	Count	9	5	10	4	4	32
		Column %	5,9	3,3	6,5	2,6	2,6	4,2
	No, definitely against`	Count	10	1	8	4	1	24
		Column %	6,6	7	5,2	2,6	6	3,1
	Difficult to say`	Count	7	1	4	1	0	13
		Column %	4,6	7	2,6	6	0	1,7
	Total	Count	152	151	153	156	154	766
		Column %	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Table 34: Willingness to join the EU

	Yes	Difficult to say	No	Total
Count	697	32	37	766
Row %	91,0	4,2	4,8	100,0


Table 35: Estimation of cross-border co-operation so far. Is it satisfactory?

			Country					Total
			Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Romania	Ukrain	
Estimation of the cross-border co-operation so far. Is it satisfactory?	Yes, it is satisfactory	Count	3	0	3	7	8	21
		Column %	2,0	0	2,0	4,5	5,2	2,8
	Yes, in some fields it is more than in others	Count	8	16	3	21	7	55
		Column %	5,2	11,2	2,0	13,5	4,6	7,3
	It isn't too satisfactory	Count	59	67	50	58	78	312
		Column %	38,6	46,9	33,3	37,4	51,0	41,4
	No, definitely not	Count	45	15	60	36	41	197
		Column %	29,4	10,5	40,0	23,2	26,8	26,1
	Difficult to say	Count	38	45	34	33	19	169
		Column %	24,8	31,5	22,7	21,3	12,4	22,4
	Total	Count	153	143	150	155	153	754
		Column %	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0


Table 36: Estimation of the cross-border co-operation so far. Is it satisfactory?

	Yes, in some fields it is more than in others	It isn't too satisfactory	No, definitely not	Difficult to say	Total
Count	21	55	312	169	754
Row %	2,8	7,3	41,1	22,4	100,0


Graf 1: Barriers




Graf 2: Willingness to join the NATO



Graf 3: Willingness to join the EU



Graf 4: Estimation of the cross-border co-operation so far. Is it satisfactory?



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